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PATIENTS AS VICTIMS-HOSPITAL
LIABILITY FOR THIRD-PARTY CRIME
Our whole society seems to be going toward
violence, and hospitals are no exception.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Patients who enter hospitals for healthcare do not expect to be victims of
violent crime. Nevertheless, when an Alabama woman, suffering from pain,
entered Huntsville Hospital for kidney stone treatment, she became the victim
of a sexual assault.2  A male intruder entered her hospital room at
approximately 6:00 a.m., a time well outside the hospital's posted visiting
hours.' The intruder found the helpless patient lying in her hospital bed,
heavily sedated from a pain medication injection.4 The man sexually assaulted
her, and the four security guards on duty did nothing The victim brought a
lawsuit against the hospital and won on appeal.
6
The public's and the hospital administrators' perception that hospitals are
safe havens for ailing patients7 may no longer be valid.' Although healthcare
1. AMERICAN HEALTH CONSULTANTS, Fight Security Problems with Tough RM Agenda, HosP.
RISK MGMT., May 1989, at 57.
2. Facts taken from Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Ala. 1992). See also
infra notes 253-69 and accompanying text.
3. Id. The actual posted visiting hours were contested, but the plaintiff contended that the
visiting hours were from 10:00 a.m. until 8:30 p.m.
4. Id. at 1390. See also infra notes 253-69 and accompanying text.
5. Id. at 1387.
6. Id.
7. Hospitals were not always seen as safe places, and hospitals originated as charitable
institutions that primarily provided shelter for the poor. IRVING J. LEWIS & CECIL G. SHEPS, THE
SICK CITADEL 54 (1983). By 1920, the public no longer perceived hospitals as only refuges for the
urban poor. CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS 341 (1987). Instead, hospitals
were viewed as "awesome citadels of science and bureaucratic order." PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 145 (1982). The advent of aseptic techniques and
disease-related knowledge made hospitals more acceptable to the upper and middle classes. Id. at
145. Religious and ethnic hospitals evolved primarily to alleviate discrimination among various
groups. Id. Religious communities recognized that "[eintering a hospital necessarily involved
encounters with strangers at times of weakness and vulnerability, but the encounters might be less
threatening if the hospital authorities were of the same faith or, even better, of the same ethnic
background." Id. at 173-74.
As hospitals moved toward the center of the health care system, the sick entered hospitals for
help in regaining health, rather than for comfort care and help in dying. LEWIS & SHEPS, supra,
at 54. "Indeed, the sick le[ft] their homes and enter[ed] hospitals because of the superior treatment
there promised them." University of Louisville v. Hammock, 106 S.W. 219, 220 (Ky. Ct. App.
419
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industry leaders consider the problem of crime to be exclusively outside the
hospital setting,9 the reality is that violent crimes, such as physical assault,"
sexual assault," rape,12  and murder,' 3  sometimes occur on hospital
premises. ' 4 Estimates suggest that one out of two hospitals has been involved
1907) (describing a patient who was injured by another patient suffering from delirium tremens).
8. James Vardalis, A Haven or a Horror: The Emerging Problem of Violent Crimes at Health
Care Facilities, HEALTH CARE BOTTOM LINE, Aug. 1989, at 3 [hereinafter Haven or Horror]; see
also James J. Vardalis, Hospital Administrators as Defendants in Security Lawsuits, J. HEALTHCARE
PROTECTION MGMT., Fall 1988 at 18 [hereinafter Hospital Administrators] (stating that recent crime
data reveals that the issue of crime in the health care setting is quickly emerging as one of major
concern for health care administrators).
9. Skip Estrella, Diagnosing Crme Trends, 1. HEALTHCARE PROTECTION MOMT., Summer
1991, at 32 (citing GEORGE P. MORSE & ROBERT F. MORSE, PROTECTING THE HEALTH CARE
FACILITY (1974) (stating that "$1,000 in crime losses per bed per year is a conservative estimate."));
see also AMERICAN HEALTH CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 58 (stating that the Joint Commission
on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations "maintains that most hospitals do not face serious
security problems"); Recent Cases: Sorrell v. St. James Hosp., No. L-047213086 (N.J. Super.,
filed June 23, 1988), 32 ATLA L. REP. 157 (May 1989) (reporting of a settlement between a
patient-victim and a hospital). The patient claimed that the hospital negligently allowed a vagrant
to rape her in her room after he accosted other patients and raped an elderly patient in the hospital
bed next to the patient-victim's. The hospital claimed that it had not breached its security because
"patient rape was an unavoidable problem in urban hospitals." Id. But see Russell L. Coiling,
Trends in Hospital Security, HosP. SECURITY & SAFETY MGMT., Jan. 1993 at 13 (describing new
Joint Committee of Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations standards that go into effect in 1993).
See infra note 24.
10. See, e.g., Roettger v. United Hosp., 380 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (female
patient physically assaulted by a male intruder in hospital); Gunman Shoots Three in LA Hospital,
THE FORT WAYNE NEWS-SENTINEL (Fort Wayne, Ind.), February 9, 1993, at H4 [hereinafter
Gunman] (gunman who burst into city emergency room with three guns, demanding pain medication,
and shot three emergency room physicians after holding two women hostage for several hours).
11. See, e.g., Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386 (Ala. 1992) (female patient sexually
assaulted in hospital by male intruder).
12. See, e.g., Copithorne v. Framinghan Union Hosp., 520 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1988)
(describing a visiting physician who raped a hospital patient); Freeman v. St. Clare's Hosp. &
Health Ctr., 548 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (emergency room patient who was in
multiple restraints and was raped by another patient).
13. Rhines v. Herzel, 392 A.2d 298 (Pa. 1978) (mental hospital patient killed another patient
and buried body on hospital grounds); Small v. McKennan Hosp., 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1987)
(hospital employee who was visiting a hospital and was murdered in the parking garage); Indictment
Charges Nurse Gave Fatal Drug Injection, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 22, 1988, at 12 (nurse indicted
for allegedly killing hospital patients with drug injections); Nurse Sentenced to Mne Years for
Murder Attempt, Forgery, Moo. HEALTHCARE, Aug. 12, 1988, at 67 (nurse convicted of attempting
to kill AIDS patient with drug overdose).
14. Many other crimes occur on hospital premises, but it is beyond the scope of this Note to
fully discuss them all. Some examples include: infant kidnappings, bomb threats, thefts, robberies,
hostage taking, and other terrorist acts. Anthony L. Best, Preventing Violence in Hospitals, J.
HEALTHCARE PROTECTION MOMT., Spring 1990, at 76 (stating that violence in hospitals can take
the form of infant kidnappings, bomb threats, assaults, robberies, rapes, and murders); see also
Crime in Hospitals, 1988,1989-The Latest IAHSS Surveys, J. HEALTHCARE PROTECTION MGMT.,
Summer 1991, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Crime in Hospitals] (indicating that hospitals reported such crimes
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in a security-based lawsuit as of 1992."5 As one author states, "[t]he frontlines
of healthcare . ..have, in some cases, become battlegrounds.""6 As a result
of such violent crimes, security-related lawsuits against hospitals are rapidly
increasing. 17
Today's hospitals function as businesses," and traditionally, courts have
been reluctant to hold business owners liable for third-party criminal acts that
as arson, sexual assault, armed robberies, bomb threats, thefts, suicides, and kidnappings); Haven
or Horror, supra note 8, at 3 (describing health care facilities that reported rapes, robberies, and
assaults on the premises); Bruce K. Smock, IAHS Survey of Infant Abductions: 1983-1989, J.
HEALTHCARE PROTECTION MGMT., Fall 1989, at 40, 48 (containing a survey of infant kidnappings
in healthcare facilities); AMERICAN HEALTH CONSULTANTS, In the News: Baby Thefi, "Angel of
Death" Could Hit You, Too, HOSp. RISK MGMT., Oct. 1987, at 125, 129 (stating that hospitals could
face infant kidnappings and patients murdered by health care workers).
15. Russell L. Coiling, Hospital Security: Is the Patient at Risk?, J. HEALTHCARE PROTECTION
MOMr., Suitmer 1991, at 37.
16. Terry L. Selby, Nurses Face Growing Risk of Violence & Abuse, AM. NURSE, Apr. 1992,
at 3. For a recent dramatic example that demonstrates that the frontlines of healthcare have become
battlegrounds, see Gunman, supra note 10, at H4 (describing a man who burst into a busy inner-city
emergency room with three guns, demanded pain medication, and then shot three emergency room
physicians after holding two women hostage for several hours); see also Three Wounded as Patient
Opens Fire, THE FORT WAYNE JOURNAL-GAzETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), July 11, 1993, at I lA
(describing a male patient who used a handgun to shoot two security guards and a visitor in a
Michigan City, Indiana emergency room). Although some hospitals claim that violent incidents are
infrequent and occur because of the explosive reactions of only a small percentage of patients or
their families and friends, these violent incidents "make the emergency room appear . . . like a
battlefield." Saralie Faivelson, Weapons in the Wards: Violence Nationwide at imes Turns ERs
Into Combat Zones, MED. WORLD NEWs, Mar. 1993 at 60.
17. Crime in Hospitals, supra note 14, at 2. This represents a twenty-nine percent increase in
security-related lawsuits since 1987. Id. Responding hospitals reported a total of forty-nine
incidents. Id. Fewer hospitals responded in 1989 (315) than in 1988 (340). Id. A direct result of
increasing crime is that courts and juries are more willing to hold hospitals responsible for violence
on the premises. Janine Fiesta, Criminal Liability for the Nurse, NURSING MGMT., Apr. 1992, at
17.
18. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965)
(recognizing hospitals as businesses), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); James J. McCabe & Eric
W. Springer, Emerging Issues in Hospital Law, FOR THE DEFENSE, June 1992, at 2 (stating that
hospitals function as businesses as well as houses of healing); Victoria L. Nelson, Legal Aspects of
Hospital Security, 3 J. HEALTHCARE PROTECTION MGMT., 1978, at 61 (stating that hospitals must
act as businesses to protect patients); see also ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 347 (1987) ("[Ihe
hospital never assumed the guise of rational and rationalized economic actor .... It was never
managed as a factory or department store. The hospital continued into the twentieth century to be
clothed with the public interest.. . ."); David G. Spackman, Healthcare in the 90's, 32 BOSTON
BAR J., Nov./Dec. 1988, at 8 (recognizing that hospitals represent big business). Although private
hospitals may have charitable goals, their central purpose is institutional survival. Id. But see
Arthur F. Southwiek, The Hospital's New Responsibility, 17 CLEVELAND-MARSHALLL. REv. 146
(1968) ("A hospital does not... consist of two organizations-business and medical. Rather, it is
a single organization.").
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occur on the business premises. 9 Nevertheless, modem courts are modifying
common law doctrines of premises liability to allow a crime victim the status of
a civil litigant in actions against premises owners, including business owners.'
Courts are increasingly faced with the "crime-victim-as-civil-litigant," and they
have reacted in varied ways."' As courts move away from common law
doctrines of premises liability, some courts impose liability on the premises
owner, while other courts refuse to impose liability, recognizing the rule of no
duty to protect from crimes. 22
As courts modify common law premises liability doctrines, some hospitals
are being held liable for injuries their patients suffer at the hands of third
19. See, e.g., Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that,
generally, business owners owe no duty to protect others from third-party criminal attacks); see also
Michael J. Yelnosky, Comment, Business Inviters'Duty to Protect Invitees from Criminal Acts, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 883 (1986).
20. Linda S. Calvert Hanson & Charles W. Thomas, Third Party Ton Remedies for Crime
Victims-Searching for the "Deep Pocket" and a Risk Free Society, 18 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1988).
Third-party tort remedies are of judicial, not legislative, origin. Id. at 32-33. See infra part IV and
accompanying notes.
21. Yelnosky, supra note 19, at 883 (stating that some courts are responding to the move to
eliminate the no-duty rule, while others continue to apply the traditional rule of no-duty for the
premises owner to protect others from criminal acts); see also infra part V and accompanying notes.
22. Yelnosky, supra note 19. The third-party victims' rights arena is volatile and raises some
difficult questions. First, is it fair to impose responsibility on a third party for a plaintiff's injuries,
which were due to a criminal's actions? Second, if a third party's actions occasioned a reasonably
foreseeable risk of criminal activity, should the victim be left without a remedy at law? Frank
Carrington, Victims' Rights: A New Ton?, TRIAL, June 1978, at 41 [hereinafter Carrington, A New
Tort?].
The courts are divided as to these inquiries. Some courts have held premises owners liable
for failing to adequately secure the premises. See, e.g., Garzilli v. Howard Johnson's Motor
Lodges, Inc., 419 F. Supp 1210 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (awarding singer Connie Francis $2.5 million for
motel's failure to provide adequate security to prevent intruder from entering her room and raping
her); Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985) (holding a hospital negligent
in its failure to provide adequate security to prevent physical assault on doctor in parking lot);
Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 50 N.E.2d 497 (11. 1943) (holding a railroad liable for rape and
assault of female passenger because it had notice that hobos and tramps were loitering on the
premises). Other courts, employing the theory that the premises owner should not be made an
insurer against criminal activity, have held that the premises owner owed no duty to the victim.
Carrington, A New Ton?, supra, at 41. See, e.g., Moye v. A.G. Gaston Motels, Inc., 499 So. 2d
1368 (Ala. 1986) (holding that a premises owner owed no duty of protection absent a special
relationship); Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975) (holding that shopping mall
merchants owed no duty to shopper to guard against third-party criminal acts); Wright v. Webb, 362
S.E.2d 919 (Va. 1987) (holding that motel owners owed no duty of protection to female theater
patron to protect her from assault in adjacent parking lot). Nevertheless, even conservative courts
are changing direction in premises liability cases and are joining the trend in the law to impose
liability. Virginia Cope, Third-Pary Liability, TRIAL, Oct. 1988, at 85 (citing K.S.R. v. Novak &
Sons, 406 N.W.2d 636 (Neb. 1987); Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455 (Okla. 1987)).
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parties.' However, because courts have not developed a consistent standard
on which to base liability,' hospitals are uncertain as to what steps they must
take to protect patients from the violent criminal acts of persons not employed
by the hospital.' Hospitals are also uncertain as to how to protect themselves
from liability for unforeseeable third-party criminal acts.6
Increasing violence is costing hospitals money. Combatting the rise in
violence entails new expenditures for security, employee training, and insurance.
Hospitals are frequently unable to insure against liability caused by the violent
23. See infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text. This note deals only with patient
victimization. Hospital employees also suffer criminal victimization at the hands of third parties.
See, e.g., Johns v. Department of Health & Rehab. Serv., 485 So. 2d 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (describing a hospital employee that was injured by a patient in the hospital lobby); Miller v.
Johns Hopkins Hosp., 469 A.2d 466 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (claiming that a hospital employee
was denied workers' compensation benefits for injuries she received from sexual assault while en
route to work). Patients are injured by not only unrelated third parties, but also family members.
See infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
24. See infra part V and accompanying notes. In addition to the courts' failures to develop a
consistent standard, courts are "finding new ways to hold hospitals accountable for crimes actually
committed by others." Jack S. Dawson & James A. Scimeca, Hospital Crimes: Expecting the
Unexpected, HEALTHSPAN, Nov. 1990, at 3. Accrediting agencies have also failed to provide
hospitals with specific standards on which to rely. See, e.g., The Health Care Financing Agency's
Form HCFA-1537 (4-89), STANDARD: BUILDINGS, Code A227(a), at 30 (1989), the measurement
used by the Indiana State Board of Health to evaluate hospital safety and security. The standard
provides: "The condition of the physical plant and the overall hospital environment must be
developed and maintained in such a manner that the safety and well-being of patients are assured."
The Joint Commission of Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) also evaluates hospital
security, and its standard PL.1 provides: "There is a safety management program that is designed
to provide a physical environment free of hazards and to manage staff activities to reduce the risk
of human injury." A sub-heading under PL. 1, PL. 1.2 requires that the safety management program
be based on "organizational experience, applicable law and regulation, and accepted practice." I
JOINT COMMISSION OF ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: STANDARDS 129 (1993). Although JCAHO inspects hospitals regularly
for accreditation purposes, its standards provide hospitals with no more guidance than have recent
court decisions.
25. See infra part VI. This note will consider injuries caused by third parties who are not
hospital employees, but rather actors from outside the hospital. For examples of cases dealing with
patients injured by hospital employees, see, e.g., Rachals v. State, 361 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. Ct. App.
1987) (finding a nurse guilty but mentally ill in charge of aggravated assault with intent to murder
patient when she administered potassium chloride to a critically ill patient); State v. Simon, 157
A.2d 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (indicting a nurse for second degree manslaughter for choking
patient); State v. Raines, 344 S.E.2d 138 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (convicting a nurse of engaging
in sexual acts with patient).
26. Courts have expanded the situations where hospitals can be held liable for a third party's
criminal acts. Dawson & Scimeca, supra note 24, at 3; see also Marilyn M. Pesto, The Special
Problems of the Hospital as Defendant, 15 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J., 1990, at 43 ("In the
past few years, hospital liability has expanded ... to almost total responsibility for every occurrence
in the hospital.").
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acts of third parties because the risk is unforeseeable.' The increased financial
burden may cause already weakened hospitals in neighborhoods that most need
healthcare to fail.' To alleviate the financial uncertainty of defending lawsuits
that stem from third-party crimes, state legislatures must give hospitals guidance
as to the duty they owe their patients by way of a statute regulating hospital
security." Such a statute would help a hospital by clarifying the extent of its
duty to protect its patients from third-party crime and establishing a consistent
standard to which it can conform.
This Note will discuss and analyze the emerging trend of imposing liability
upon hospitals for patients harmed by third-party criminal acts. Section II of
this Note discusses the extent of the patient victimization problem." An
examination of the emerging tort of third-party liability for hospitals and its
effects follows in Section III."' In Section IV, the evolution of premises owner
liability is discussed, tracing the basis on which hospital premises liability
rests. 2 Section V analyzes court responses to the issue of patient victimization
and various tests that courts have used to deal with this matter.3 Section VI
examines the effect of imposing liability on hospitals.' Finally, Section VII
offers a model statute that regulates hospital security as a solution to the problem
of the uncertain liability hospitals face, resulting from the inconsistent standards
that courts have used to remedy patient victimization. 5
27. See infra notes 236-53 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 306, 313 and accompanying text. One author, suggesting that legislatures
enact uniform security legislation to insure minimum safety standards for tenants, stated: "However,
crime levels vary widely according to locale .... Therefore, the language of the statute should
clearly specify not only the required security devices, but also inform landlords that they are
required to implement whatever additional security measures they deem reasonably necessary to
deter criminal activity." Arthur E. Petersen, The Landlord's Liability for Criminal Injuries-The
Duty to Protect, 24 TULsA LJ. 280 (1988). The same theory applies to patients in hospitals:
legislatures should provide minimum uniform safety standards for hospitals to follow. Some courts
contend that the question of extending hospital liability to include a duty to protect patients from
third-party criminal acts is a policy question that is better left to the legislature, rather than the
courts. See, e.g., G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 746 P.2d 731 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (find that
hospital was liable for protection of patient who was sexually assaulted by hospital employee, under
the theory of premises liability, even if hospital was not liable for negligent hiring).
30. See infra notes 36-73 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 98-197 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 198-270 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 271-313 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 314-35 and accompanying text.
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II. NATURE AND EXTENT OF PATIENT VICTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Estimates suggest that more than four million Americans are victims of
crime each year.' One government survey has predicted that a child who is
twelve years old today has an eighty-three percent chance of being a violent-
crime victim during the child's lifetime.37 More than thirty-five million
citizens are likely to experience victimization in a given year. 8 The United
States Department of Justice reported that in 1991, one violent crime occurred
every seventeen seconds, one forcible rape occurred every five minutes, and one
aggravated assault occurred every twenty-nine seconds.39 Crime touches every
aspect of our society,' and at least one governmental agency has recognized
that violence is both a criminal justice and a health problem.4 ' The healthcare
system is deluged with victims of violence.42 Violence is costly in human
terms because our sense of security is threatened, and also in terms of health-
care dollars, because crime victims seek help within the health care system.43
The frightening statistics above do not exempt hospital patients, who are
also at risk of crime victimization.' A 1988-89 survey revealed that non-
sexual assaults in hospitals increased in 1989.' 5 Inner-city hospitals are
36. The prevalence of crime in our society increases the possibility that a given person will be
the victim of a violent crime. Jane L. Uva, Urban Violence: A Health Care Issue, J. AM. MED.
ASS'N, Jan. 5, 1990, at 135. Some of the factors that affect the crime rate and types of crimes
committed in different geographical areas include: population density and the degree of
urbanization, composition of the population variables, stability of the area's population, economic
conditions, cultural characteristics, climate, and variations in how the area's law enforcement
agencies, judicial system, and citizens treat crime. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1991, at v (1992).
37. Hanson& Thomas, supra note 20, at 4 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE PUB. NO. NCJ-104274, LIFETIME LIKEIHOOD OF VICTIMIZATION (B.J.S. TECHNICAL
REPORT) (1987)).
38. Id.
39. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 36, at 4 (1992).
40. Id. at v (1988). According to the report, crime is a serious concern, not only for law
enforcement agencies, but also for society at large.
41. Jacquelyn Campbell, Violence Demands Nursing Solutions: Editorial, AM. NURSE, Apr.
1992, at 4 (citing Health People 2000) (describing an entire section of ways to decrease violence,




44. Coiling, supra note 15, at 38. Hospital patients are victims of crimes that run from petty
thefts at one end of the continuum to more violent crimes causing death at the other.
45. Crime in Hospitals, supra note 14, at 2. For the 1988 survey, 340 hospitals responded,
but only 315 hospitals responded to the 1989 survey.
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particularly affected by this increase.' Another survey reported that, of 170
United States teaching hospitals, forty-three percent reported a physical attack
one or more times a month, while eighteen percent reported one or more
displays of threatening weapons during the same time period.'7 Yet another
survey among California hospitals indicated that twenty-five percent reported
both attempted and actual violent acts on the premises.' These numbers
indicate a disturbing trend of increasing violence in all types of healthcare
facilities, from inner-city hospitals to urban community hospitals.4 9
Because of their unique characteristics, hospitals are particularly vulnerable
to criminal activity. During a hospital's twenty-four hour service, it sustains
constant traffic and activity.' Criminals can easily avoid detection in hospitals
because of this activity, the number of people, and also the confusion and
distraction the hospital can cause to patients and visitors. 5 1  Patients and
visitors may be under great stress and, therefore, distracted and less vigilant
about their personal safety.52 Such stress, combined with other factors, may
also cause visitors and patients themselves to demonstrate violent behavior.53
46. Id. at 3. More notable than the correlation between hospital location and increased crime
rate is that all hospitals in the survey, regardless of location, experienced similar crime patterns.
For example, inner-city hospitals reported that 11.1 % experienced incidents of sexual assaults, while
8.7% of urban hospitals and 10.5 % of rural hospitals experienced incidents of sexual assaults. Id.
Another author claims that the nation's inner-city hospitals that provide services to the poor "are
especially vulnerable to violence," Faivelson, supra note 16, at 60.
47. Gregg A. Pane, Preventing & Controlling Violence in Emergency Departments, W.J. MED.,
Sept. 1991, at 285-86. The Medical College of Georgia at Augusta reported that "more than thirty
percent of our patients and visitors come into the facility armed with offensive weapons and that a
much higher percentage have ready access to weapons in their vehicles." R. Bruce Morgan, Health
Facility Crime to Worsen During 1990's, HEALTH FACILrIES MGMT., June 1989, at 26, 30; see
also Gunman, supra note 10 (describing that police recovered two handguns, a knife, and a sawed-
off rifle from gunman after he stormed an L.A. emergency room and shot three doctors); Faivelson,
supra note 16, at 60 (noting that administrators at Detroit's Henry Ford Hospital changed its security
system at the request of staff members, who reported that two to three percent of patients and
visitors carry "unauthorized metallic objects," and that patients' weapons often drop onto the floor
when patients are lying on stretchers).
48. Mary Downey, 7he Bellevue Murder: Could It Happen in Your Hospital?, J. HEALTHCARE
PROTECTION MGMT., Fall 1989, at 30, 33.
49. See Morgan, supra note 47, at 28. One author asserted that the trend in increasing violence
"may keep hospital administrators awake at night.. . ." Fiesta, supra note 17, at 17.
50. Fiesta, supra note 17, at 17; see also Haven or Horror, supra note 8, at 3 (stating that
health care facilities often unintentionally contribute to attracting criminal activity by merely
providing their services).
51. Fiesta, supra note 17, at 17.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Doctors Hosp. v. Kovats, 494 P.2d 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (patient injured
when another patient struck him with a chair); Univ. of Louisville v. Hammock, 106 S.W. 219 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1907) (patient injured when another patient suffering from delirium tremens assaulted her);
Burns v. Forsyth County Hosp., 344 S.E.2d 839 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (patient injured by patient-
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In addition, hospitals are, by definition, places where helpless and incapacitated
patients are located, and most patients are readily accessible to visitors.'
To avoid negative publicity, hospitals sometimes cloak incidents of crime
by either non-reporting or by using confidential reporting mechanisms.'
Because hospitals are reluctant to disclose the full extent of crime, statistics
about criminal acts committed on hospital premises are often misleading. 6
Confidentiality protection statutes57 prevent victims from discovering internal
hospital incident reports of physical or sexual assaults' and thereby mask the
actual numbers of violent criminal attacks that occur within hospitals.59 Some
hospitals fail to report criminal activities to law enforcement officials or to file
roommate, who threw chair); Clinton v. City of New York, 528 N.Y.S.2d 108 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988) (patient injured by roommate who stabbed her with suture scissors).
Visitors also can be a source of violence and pose a security threat to hospital occupants.
Best, supra note 14, at 79. One study of emergency department violence reported that police
received two calls a day for patient or visitor violent behavior toward staff. Pane, supra note 47,
at 286. In addition, long waits that patients and visitors experience in many emergency rooms often
exacerbate violent tendencies. Angela Brantley, Rising Violence in ERs Cause Hospitals to Redesign
Security, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 5, 1992, at 44; see also Hospitals Not Immune as Violence
Increasingly Invades ERs, HOSPITAL PATIENT RELATIONS REPORT, Sept. 1992, at 1 (citing long
waits as one reason stress is high in emergency rooms, "Delays of eight hours or more for care only
inflame tempers. . .).
54. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text. Russell Coiling compared hotel guests to
hospital patients in terms of accessibility. Hotels are reluctant to give information about their guests'
location; hospitals, in contrast, readily give patient room numbers to anyone making an inquiry.
Hotel guests are protected by a locked door, while hospital patients have no locks on their room
doors. Most hotel guests are not helpless from incapacitating illness or medication, while many
hospital patients are immobile from illness or injury, or sedated from the effects of medication.
Coiling, supra note 15, at 38-39.
55. See, e.g., Deborah Pinkney, Nurses' Danger: Attacks on Job-Violence Grows in
Hospitals, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992, at 1, 30 ("[H]ospitals are wary of bad publicity
and so are secretive about the extent of crime within their facilities . . . ."). See also Copithorne
v. Framingham Union Hosp., 520 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1987) (stating that a hospital reported two
prior rapes of patients by physician through confidential intra-hospital memorandum).
56. Pinkney, supra note 55, at 1; Smock, supra note 14, at 40, 41 (stating that no agency can
provide complete statistics about infant abductions from healthcare facilities, not even the FBI). Id.
One nurse-rescarcher noted that "violence is increasing in hospitals and is still vastly under-
reported.' Selby, supra note 16, at 3 (quoting Marilyn Lewis Lanza).
57. Confidentiality protection statutes prevent hospitals from releasing internal reporting
documents, such as incident reports and peer review records; see, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-4-12.6-4
(1992) (peer review records are privileged communications).
58. See, e.g., Copithornev. FraminghamUnionHosp., 520 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1987) (victim
raped by visiting physician had no warningabout physician's prior sexual assaults of two in-patients,
even though hospital had knowledge by confidential incident reports); Kline v. Children's Hosp.,
577 N.Y.S.2d 563 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (sexually assaulted patient denied discovery of documents
relating to incident because of court's broad interpretation of statute).
59. Pre-trial settlement measures and an inability to determine the number of third-party tort
cases filed also make it difficult to accurately determine the full extent of patient victimization cases.
Hanson & Thomas, supra note 20, at 2.
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official reports of incidents.' Non-reporting and confidential report documents
skew the picture of hospital crime, but if one extrapolates crime in the general
population to the hospital patient-population, this presents a different picture than
the available numbers indicate.
Not all third-party crime injuries result from assaults by strangers. In many
instances, a patient suffers injury at the hands of a family member or an
acquaintance.61  Such domestic violence includes spouse abuse,62  child
abuse,' and elder abuse." Victims of domestic abuse frequently seek
medical care in hospital emergency departments, and the victims are often
followed there by the abusers.' Even after patients are transferred from the
emergency department to an in-patient room, they remain at risk of further
60. Pinkney, supra note 55, at 30. The author further notes that hospitals also resist reporting
violence against employees. Other hospitals list violence against employees as a workers'
compensation claim, rather than a criminal law problem; see, e.g., Johns v. State Dep't of Health
and Rehabilitative Services, 485 So. 2d 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that employee who
was assaulted in hospital lobby after arriving at work 30 minutes early was given workers'
compensation benefits as exclusive remedy because the court found that arriving early was within
the scope of her employment); but see Miller v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 469 A.2d 466 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1984) (denying a hospital employee workers' compensation remedy when she was sexually
assaulted after she parked on a city street adjacent to hospital, even though hospital provided a
shuttle van because of crime rate in area).
61. As one author noted, "Domestic disputes rank as the top area of concern for generating
violent situations." Best, supra note 14, at 77.
62. Domestic Violence: Facts & Where to Call for Help, AM. NURSE, Apr. 1992, at 9
[hereinafter Domestic Violence] (stating that nearly two million women were battered last year,
according to the statistics from the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services); Linda L.
Meierhoffer, Nurses Battle Family Violence: Breaking the Cycle of Violence Takes 7Tme & Caring,
AM. NURSE, Apr. 1992, at 1 (reporting from healthcare and law enforcement agencies that "a
woman is battered every fifteen seconds"); Laurie J. Morrison, The Battering Syndrome: A Poor
Record of Detection in the Emergency Department, J. EMERGENCY MED., June 1988, at 521, 523
(stating that 50% of injuries that women report to emergency rooms are caused by abuse); Uva,
supra note 36, at 135 ("[V]iolence also includes domestic sexual abuse.").
63. Domestic Violence, supra note 62, at 9 (noting that two to four million children were
abused and neglected in 1991); Uva, supra note 36, at 135 (stating that violence includes the
physical abuse of children).
64. Domestic Violence, supra note 62, at 9 (stating that 700,000 to 1,300,000 cases of elder
abuse occur annually); Uva, supra note 36, at 130 (stating that violence includes the abuse of the
elderly).
65. AMERICAN HEALTH CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 59. Jewell Ray, Director of Security
at Regional Medical Center in Memphis, notes that "[iln any hospital across the country, the
E[mergencyj R[oom] is the most dangerous place." Id. Louis Gasbarro, president of the
International Association of Healthcare Security and Safety, notes that "[v]iolence in the
E[mergency] R(oom] is a spillover of violence in society." Faivelson, supra note 16, at 61.
Gasbarro suggests that, in order to deal with hospital violence, we must confront issues such as gun
control, homelessness, and domestic violence. Id.
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injury from their abusers.' Hospital personnel often inadvertently assist the
abuser in finding the patient's whereabouts by freely providing patient room
numbers.6'
When a patient suffers injuries inflicted by a third-party criminal, the
hospital is vulnerable to third-party tort actions because it makes a more
attractive defendant than the actual criminal.' The hospital represents a "deep
pocket"' for compensating victims for injuries inflicted by the criminal.'
The third-party criminal is often judgment-proof, and therefore the hospital
becomes the target of the lawsuit.7 The defense bar and some insurance
organizations have resisted the move to third-party liability, calling the move
"another attempt by plaintiffs' attorneys to find 'deep pockets' to compensate
victims. "'
Hospital patients are susceptible to victimization at the hands of third
parties. The increasing crime rate in American society is mirrored by the
increasing incidence of crime within hospitals.' As more hospital patients
become victims of third-party crime, hospitals can expect more third-party tort
lawsuits to be filed against them. An analysis of what a third-party tort lawsuit
entails will be helpful in understanding the problems hospitals face.
III. THE EMERGING THIRD-PARTY TORT SuIT AND ITS EFFECTS
Traditional common law tort principles allow the criminal victim to sue the
assailant directly under the intentional tort theories of assault, battery, false
66. AMERICAN HEALTH CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 59. The author further explains,
"We've had families come in after a family fight. One person is treated, and the other one comes
in; and the confrontation starts all over again." Id.
67. Coiling, supra note 15, at 38. In most hospitals, admitting and nursing staff freely give
information about a patient's room location and status and provide visitor passes upon request.
Hospitals also provide maps for ease in locating the various departments on the premises.
68. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
69. "Deep pocket" is defined as a person or corporation that has the money or other resources
to pay a claim or judgment if one is made. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 415 (6th ed. 1990).
70. Hanson & Thomas, supra note 20, at 29.
71. Frank Carrington, Victims'Rights Litigation: A Wave of the Future?, 11 U. RICH. L. REV.
447, 449 (1977) [hereinafter Carrington, Victims' Rights Litigation]. Generally, the hospital will
not be judgment-proof and will therefore be able to pay any judgment levied against it. Id.
72. Cope, supra note 22, at 86. According to Cope, plaintiffs' attorneys view it as their duty
to their clients to find a responsible party who can provide compensation for the victim's injuries.
Unfortunately, because the criminal can rarely provide adequate compensation, the victim must seek
recovery elsewhere. Id.
73. See supra notes 7-17, 36-67 and accompanying text.
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imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.'4 Nevertheless,
most criminals are judgment-proof:75 the criminal is unable to pay a judgment
levied against him or her.'6 Thus, intentional tort remedies work only if the
criminal is available for trial and has the financial resources to pay damages to
the victim." The criminal who is available for trial often ends up in jail,
thereby unable to earn wages to pay a judgment.' One judge suggested that
the threat of civil actions may deter criminals;' 9 however, if criminals are
unable to pay a judgment, they need only worry about serving a jail sentence if
they are apprehended.
To remedy the problem ofjudgment-proof criminals, tort law developments
enable crime victims to recover damages from the owner on whose premises the
crime occurred.s' In a special category of tort actions, third-party tort actions,
the victim alleges that the premises owner has a duty to protect invitees from the
intentional crimes of third persons."' This tort action's legal theory, sounding
in negligence, requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant breached a
legally recognized duty, causing the plaintiff actual damage or loss."' Third-
74. Carrington, A New Tort?, supra note 22, at 40. These are examples of intentional torts for
which the patient-plaintiff can recover damages in a civil lawsuit against the criminal. An intent to
invade the interests of another has been traditionally forbidden by the law, and a finding of intent
has caused courts to impose greater responsibility on the actor. W. PAGE KEETON ST AL., PROSSER
& KEETON ON TORTS, § 8, at 36-37 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEnTON].
75. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 74, at 36-37; see also Hanson & Thomas, supra note 20,
at 7.
76. A judgment-proof defendant is one who is insolvent, has no sufficient property within the
court's jurisdiction to satisfy a judgment, or whose wages are exempt under statutory protection.
BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 845 (6th ed. 1990).
77. Hanson & Thomas, supra note 20, at 7. The situation in the majority of cases is such that
the assailant/criminal is not apprehended or, if apprehended, is judgment-proof. Id.
78. Carrington, Victims' Rights Litigation, supra note 71, at 456. Relatively few civil actions
have been filed against assailants because most criminals are indigent and therefore judgment-proof,
and are often in jail following trial. Id.
79. Id. at 457 (quoting INDIANAPOUS STAR, June 10, 1976, at 17, col. 3 (reporting on a speech
made by Judge John B. Wilson, Jr. of the Marion County, Indiana, Criminal Court)).
80. Hanson & Thomas, supra note 20, at 1. Spurred by the victims' rights movement that
gained momentum in the 1960s, courts have accepted expanded theories of liability wherein the
premises owner is liable for injuries resulting from a third party's criminal acts. Cope, supra note
22, at 85; see also infra notes 299-304 and accompanying text.
81. Cope, supra note 22, at 85. Another type of third-party crime victim case involves the
government as defendant and alleges that the government is negligent for its failure to protect or
prevent crime, or for negligently handling prisoners and dangerous mental patients. Frank
Carrington, Crime Victims' Rights, TRIAL, Jan. 1988, at 79 [hereinafter Carrington, Crime Victims'
Rights].
82. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 74, at 164-65.
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party tort actions hold the premises owner, rather than the actual perpetrator,'
liable for the victim's injuries."
The third-party tort action's success depends on the victim showing that,
although the criminal is the one who actually caused the harm, the premises
owner's negligence afforded the criminal an opportunity to harm the victim.
85
The patient must prove, therefore, that the hospital owed a general duty of
protection from crime while on the hospital's premises."
As third-party tort actions flourish, writers posit various theories for the
courts' move from the traditional common law doctrine." One theory suggests
that courts are responding to the plight of victims and the resultant victims'
rights movement.' This responsiveness to crime victims shows the courts'
tendency to be influenced by societal changes. Another theory suggests that
courts are replying to increases in the nation's crime rate by imposing liability
on premises owners.' Yet another theory is that imposing liability forces
premises owners to create a safer environment.' One author suggests that
courts are abandoning traditional negligence doctrine because of fundamental
83. The traditional view held that in third party lawsuits, the crime victims were not the proper
litigants. Carrington, Crime Victims' Rights, supra note 81, at 81. The criminal does not escape
all legal liability, however, even if the premisas owner is held liable to the victim, because if the
criminal is convicted, he or she is sent to prison. Cope, supra note 22, at 85.
84. Carrington, A New Tort?, supra note 22, at 39. Third party lawsuits allow the victim to
"bypass the actual perpetrator and sue the third party whose negligence has allegedly resulted in his
being victimized." Id. at 40. But see Hanson & Thomas, supra note 20, at 5 (stating that it has
"long been possible for crime victims to bring tort actions against the person who inflicted the injury
and to receive compensation for such injury").
85. Carrington, A New Tort?, supra note 22, at 40. The victim essentially bypasses an action
against the one who did the actual criminal harm, and sues instead the party whose negligence
allegedly caused the victimization.
86. Id. at 41; see also Hospital Administrators, supra note 8, at 19. The basic issue driving
the growth of hospital premises liability lawsuits is that health care facilities, because they invite
patients and visitors onto the premises, owe these classes of people a higher duty of protection than
do non-business entities. Id.
87. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
88. Hanson & Thomas, supra note 20; see also Cope, supra note 22, at 86 (quoting Frank
Nutter, President Alliance of American Insurers, "[The] trial bar has become more aggressive and
more creative in seeking recovery for their clients, and the law and the courts have allowed this.").
89. Cathy S. Harris & Burke Gilbertson, Business Owner Liability for Criminal Acts of Third
Persons, FOR THE DEFENSE, May 1989, at 14. The effect is that, in their attempts to solve one
problem, courts have created another problem.
90. Cope, supra note 22, at 86. Property owners, seeing a few such successful lawsuits, will
be motivated to take measures to secure their property. Also, victims' rights litigation has built into
it an aspect of preventing future victimization. Id.
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changes in social and judicial attitudes toward our liability system's goals.9'
For whatever reason, courts are expanding the area of premises liability and
moving away from the common law doctrine.
Congress and some state legislatures recognize the financial consequences
of victimization and have enacted victim compensation legislation.' Such
legislation, based on the state's duty to protect its citizens, provides
compensation to a citizen who has been victimized." The theory upon which
compensation is based is that the state failed its duty and is, therefore, liable to
its citizen.' Victim compensation programs, although helpful, have had only
limited success."5 One reason that compensation statutes are only partially
successful is that some states base their compensation on a determination of the
victim's financial need." Thus, if a victim's balance sheet fails to demonstrate
financial hardship, the state offers no compensation. Such provisions fail to
restore victims to their original status, and therefore encourage litigants to seek
compensation from innocent third parties, such as hospitals. Given the origins
of premises liability,97 imposing liability on innocent third-party premises
owners is an extraordinary development. An analysis of premises liability
origins will help to clarify the significance of liability for third-party crime.
91. James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 483 (1976). Professor Henderson suggests that the traditional concepts of
compensation are now viewed as suspect and inequitable when injured plaintiffs are denied recovery.
92. See, e.g., Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10604 (Supp. IV 1986).
Examples of state statutes include Ala. Code § 15-18-67 (1992), Iowa Code § 910.2 (West Supp.
1992), and Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 780.766 (3) (West Supp. 1992).
93. Carrington, Victims' Rights Litigation, supra note 71, at 452. Victim compensation
programs provide victims compensation from the government and not the criminal, whether the
criminal is apprehended or not. David L. Roland, Progress in the Victim Reform Movement: No
Longer the "Forgotten Victim," 17 PEPP. L. REV. 35, 43 (1989).
94. Carrington, Victims' Rights Litigation, supra note 71, at 452.
95. Id. (stating that although victim compensation laws are good in theory, they have extensive
limitations). Another author states that "our legal system has not in the past and does not now
contain effective mechanisms which permit crime victims to obtain equitable relief for harm suffered
at the hands of offenders." Hanson & Thomas, supra note 20, at 7. David Roland notes that prior
to 1984, many victim compensationprograms were in poor condition because of insufficient funding
and provided only limited benefits, while severely restricting candidates. Roland, supra note 93,
at 43.
96. See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-368.1 (Michie 1992).
97. See infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
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IV. EVOLUTION OF PREMISES OWNER LLABILrrY
A. Traditional Rules of Landlord/Tenant Law
The shift from land owners to land leasers" provided the impetus for the
shift in liability from the criminal to the premises owner. The basis of the duty
to protect others upon the premises springs from the common law recognition
that the land owner or possessor is the best person to know about potential
dangers on the land." The visitor's entrant classification determined the scope
of the premises owner's duty."r The only duty the common law imposed on
the premises owner to protect an invitee against an unknown assailant was for
reasonably foreseeable criminal acts.' Many jurisdictions abolished the
traditional entrant classification scheme"° and replaced it with a reasonable or
98. Statistics show a trend of less owner-occupation and more renter-occupation of the land in
the United States. For example, in 1890, the total farms were 4,767,179: owner-occupied farms
were 3,142,746, but renter-occupied farms were only 1,624,433. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, at 395 (1961). By
1950, of a total of 5,721,022 total farms, 3,758,320 were owner occupied, and 1,962,702 were
renter occupied. Id.
99. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 74, at 386.
100. Id. at 393. The common law recognized three main categories of entrants on land:
trespassers, licensees, and invitees. Prosser defines a trespasser as a person who enters without the
possessor's consent. Id. The common law imposed no duty of care on the land possessor for
protecting the trespasser. Id.
A licensee is any person who comes on the land with the possessor's consent. Id. at 412. The
possessor owed a duty to warn the licensee of any known dangers. Id. However, the possessor did
not have a duty to inspect the premises or to make the premises safe for a licensee. Peterson v.
Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1972).
Invitees are people who enter the premises to conduct business with the possessor and are
owed a duty of protection against dangers the possessor knows about and also those that are
discoverable with reasonable care. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 74, at 419; see also G. Robert
Friedman & Kathleen J. Worthington, Trends in Holding Business Organizations Liable for the
Criminal Acts of Third Persons on the Premises: A Texas Perspective, 32 S. TEX. L. REV. 257,
259 (1981) (stating that duty that landowner owed is frequently determined by entrant's common law
status).
101. Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tenn. 1975); see PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 74, at 428. "However, we are also aware that the duty imposed upon a possessor of land to
keep his property safe for his tenants and invitees also carries with it strong social considerations
which have been firmly embedded in our legal structure since the earliest days of common law."
Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975).
102. See, e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 639 (1959)
(rejecting traditional common law distinction between licensee and invitee and imposing a "duty of
exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case" on ship owners); Rowland v.
Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (holding that a landowner should be judged by whether the
landowner acted reasonably; plaintiff's status as trespasser, licensee, or invitee should not be
determinative of the owner's liability); Keller v. Mols, 472 N.E.2d 161 (11. App. Ct. 1984) (holding
that neighbor had no duty to warn child of danger of hockey without using protective equipment);
Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972) (holding that father had duty to warn child's 11-
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ordinary person standard of care."
The issue of who should be liable for a visitor's injury became more
complex as landowners leased their land to tenants."°  Initially, a lease
conveyed a possessory interest in land.'05 The tenant, therefore, acquired an
estate that carried with it the responsibilities of the land possessor.'06 When
the lease was conveyed, the common law recognized that the landlord
relinquished the land's possession and control to the tenant." Additionally,
the landlord had no further right to go on the land without the tenant's
permission."m Therefore, the common law imposed no duty on the landlord
to protect tenants from a third-party's criminal activities.' 09 Instead, in the
landlord/tenant relationship, the common law applied the doctrine of caveat
lessee," ° thereby relieving the landlord of any duty to maintain the leased
year-old friend of dangers of carbon monoxide inhalation); Genovay v. Fox, 143 A.2d 229, 235
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958) (describing conventional classifications of entrants undergoing
erosion in the law).
103. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1958) (stating that
reasonable care under the circumstances is the proper test for ship owners); Rowland v. Christian,
443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (holding that land occupier has duty to warn of dangerous conditions and
is responsible for injuries to others caused by his lack of ordinary care); Mile High Fence Co. v.
Radovich, 489 P.2d 308, 314 (Colo. 1971) (deciding that legal entrant status not sole determinant;
reasonable person is proper test); see also Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modem Status of Rules
Conditioning Landowner's Liability upon Status of Injured Party as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser,
22 A.L.R.4th 294 (1983).
The courts have created a fictitious person to exemplify the objective standard of care by
which to measure a person's conduct: "the reasonable man of ordinary prudence." PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 74, at 174 (citing Vaughn v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490
(1837), which was probably the first case to set out the standard of "man of ordinary prudence").
The standard has been described as a reasonable person, a person of ordinary prudence, or a person
ofreasonableprudence. Id. The courts haveused these descriptivephrases interchangeablyto mean
the same thing. Id. That is, the actor is held to those actions which an ideal person would do (or
be supposed to do) in the same situation. Id.
104. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
105. JESSE DUKEMNIER.& JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 386 (2d ed. 1988).
106. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 74, at 434.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Ramsay v. Morrisette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969) (reversing a judgment for the
tenant and remanding the case for further determination as to whether the landlord knew of a
dangerous situation, although recognizing the common law doctrine that imposed no duty on the
landlord); see also Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Landlord's Obligation to Protect Tenant Against
Activities of Third Persons, 43 A.L.R.3d 331 (1972).
110. The tenant took the premises "as is," and the landlord was under no obligation to
guarantee that the premises were fit for anything. DUKEMINIER & KIER, supra note 105, at 458.
Caveat lessee is based upon the notion of caveat emptor, which is defined as "let the buyer beware."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990).
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premises. Under this conventional doctrine, landlords were liable for
injuries to their tenants and to third parties only when they negligently breached
one of the few exceptions to caveat lessee. ' The tenant, not the landlord,
was the party responsible for the upkeep and repairs of the leased property." 3
Landlord liability has been the basis for much litigation in the past twenty
years." 4 As society continued to shift from the practice of owning property
to that of leasing property,' the landlord's duties also shifted to those duties
more analogous to a common law innkeeper's, rather than a landowner's." 6
One of the first major court decisions concerning the change in a landlord's
premises liability for injuries caused by a third party's criminal act was
Goldberg v. Housing Authority of Newark"1 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court
considered the issue of whether a public housing authority should provide
separate police protection for its tenants. Although the jury found for the
plaintiff, the Goldberg court held that the Housing Authority was not liable for
the plaintiff's injuries because it had no duty to provide police protection for the
premises." 8  The court reasoned that crime is foreseeable by everyone,
virtually anywhere and at anytime." 9 The court observed that if the duty to
provide police protection was based on foreseeability alone, then nearly all home
111. Petersen, supra note 29, at 262. The common law did, however, recognize a few
exceptions to the caveat emptor rule, including leases of furnished dwellings for short-term basis,
leases of under-construction buildings, and any fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment of the
property's condition. Id. at 262 n.6.
112. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. The term "caveat lessee" (let the lessee
beware) was adopted to apply to property lease situations. The exceptions to caveat lessee were to
disclose defects the landlord knew about, maintain common areas, make promised repairs, not make
fraudulent misrepresentations about the premises, and curtail any immoral conduct on the premises.
DUKEMINIER& KRiER, supra note 105, at 444-67, 497.
113. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Goldberg v.
Housing Auth., 186 A.2d 291, 296 (N.J. 1962) (deciding that no implied covenant of fitness of the
premises existed); see Petersen, supra note 29, at 262.
114. See infra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text; see also Note, Landlord's Duty to Protect
Tenanis from Criminal Acts of Third Parties: The View from 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, 59 GEO.
L.J. 1153, 1168 (1971) [hereinafter Landlord's Duty] (stating that the innkeeper, rather than the
agrarian landlord at common law, more closely approximates the modern landlord, as the modern
apartment landlord leases housing to multiple tenants in buildings with multiple units).
117. 186 A.2d 291 (N.J. 1962). The plaintiffwas delivering milk to a tenant of the defendant's
housing project. During the delivery, the plaintiff was robbed and beaten by two unknown male
assailants. Although Goldberg dealt with the housing authority's liability for a criminal attack on
a delivery person, and not a tenant, the court's analysis was based on the housing authority's duty
to provide police protection for the multi-family structure. Id. at 291-93.
118. Goldberg, 186 A.2d at 296, 299.
119. Id. at 293 (noting that in determining if a private party is responsible for the protection
of another, foreseeability is not the only inquiry).
Schendel: Patients as Victims—Hospital Liability for Third-Party Crime
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993
436 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
owners and businesses would have to patrol their premises. 2
The Goldberg court placed the responsibility for police protection upon the
government. 12 The court recognized the common law doctrine that landlords
did not imply a warranty of fitness of the premises.' Additionally, the court
noted that the historical landlord/tenant relationship did not require the landlord
to provide police protection. 121
As society became more urban, 1 the common law emphasis that a lease
conveyed only an interest in land lost some of its significance." The modem
apartment dweller's interest in a lease has little to do with the earth or terrain
itself. Rather, the lessor is interested in a place to live that comes complete with
a package of goods and services. '2 Therefore, the apartment lease of today
has a different meaning to the tenant than the lease of land had to the farmer at
common law.'" As courts interpreted the landlord's liability in the modem
120. Id. The court stated, "If foreseeability itself gave rise to a duty to provide 'police'
protection for others, every residential curtilage, every shop, every store, every manufacturing plant
would have to be patrolled by the private arms of the owner." Id. The court reasoned that the issue
involves not only the foreseeability of a criminal act, but also the landlord's duty to take affirmative
measures to prevent the act. Id. The court based its analysis of whether a duty exists on a question
of fairness, balancing several factors: the relationship of the parties, the risk and its nature, and the
public's interest in the issue. Id.
The fairness issue seemed to disturb the court. In addressing this issue, the court noted that
"(flairness ordinarily requires that a man be able to ascertain in advance of a jury's verdict whether
the duty is his and whether he has performed it." Id. at 297. The court therefore found that
imposing an unarticulated duty upon the Housing Authority without notice was unfair. Id. The
Goldberg court noted that even with police protection, a landlord cannot prevent criminal attacks.
Id.
121. Id. at 292.
122. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
123. Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 296 (N.J. 1962). The court, in
dicta, ventured that it would be a guess as to whether an unknown assailant would have been
deterred by police protection. Id. at 297.
124. The move away from an agrarian society to one that is more industrial, causing people to
live in and around cities and towns, has caused our society to become more urban. For example,
in 1910, the total rural population in the United States was 49,973,000, with an urban population
of only 41,999,000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1992, at 16 (1992). By 1990, the rural population totaled only 61,656,000, and the urban
population had swollen to 187,053,000. Id. at 27.
125. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty, 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In an agrarian
society, an interest in land might have been reasonable. Id.
126. Id. "[A] package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat,
light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation,
and proper maintenance." Id.
127. Today's apartment tenant is uninterested in a conveyance of an interest in the land, but
rather is interested in a secure place to dwell. The farmer at common law, in contrast, placed value
in the land itself. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074.
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landlord/tenant relationship, they began to make exceptions to the traditional
common law rules, thereby expanding the landlord's duties.
B. Exceptions to the Traditional Rules
Courts began to expand the landlord's liability by making exceptions to the
caveat emptor rule," s eventually resulting in the rule's abandonment." 2
One early exception imposed liability on the landlord for the common areas of
a building that were under the landlord's control."mt As to common areas, the
landlord's duty was to maintain them "in a reasonably safe condition." 3'
Common areas include, for example, halls, stairs, elevators, lobbies, and other
areas that are not leased to the tenants.' 3 2
Landlord immunity was considerably altered by the United States Court of
Appeals' decision in Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment
Corporation."' The court held that the landlord had a duty to minimize
predictable risks to the tenant when the landlord knew of past criminal acts that
occurred in common areas."' 4 The court emphasized the special relationship
between the landlord and the tenant,' 3" analogizing it to that of
innkeeper/guest. " Recognizing the landlord's unique capacity to provide the
128. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
129. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1071 (declaring an implied warranty of habitability); Peterson v.
Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Minn. 1972).
The duty required of a landowner... as to licensees and invitees is no more and no
less than that of any other alleged tortfeasor, and that duty is to use reasonable care for
the safety of all such persons invited upon the premises, regardless of the status of the
individuals.
Id.; see also Petersen, supra note 29, at 264.
130. Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 296 (N.J. 1962).
131. Id.
132. Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 843, 849 (Mich. 1975).
133. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Kline, a female apartment tenant sued her landlord
for injuries inflicted by an intruder, who had assaulted her in the hallway of the landlord's building.
Id. at 478-79.
134. Id. at 482. In reversing a judgment for the landlord, the court found that an individual
tenant does not possess the power to take adequate security precautions in the building's common
areas. Id.
135. Id. at 485.
136. Id. The court seemed to find it significant that at common law the only multiple dwelling
houses known were inns. Id. at 482. In the innkeeper/guest relationship, liability is based upon
"the innkeeper's supervision, care, or control of the premises, or by reason of a contract which some
courts have implied from the entrustment by the guest of his personal comfort and safety to the
innkeeper." Id.; see also infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
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protection that is required, 137 the court acknowledged the special relationship
between landlord and tenant.' 38 The Kline court concluded that, in a special
relationship, the party possessing control should have a duty to reasonably
protect the other from reasonably anticipated third-party assaults. 139
In addition to the landlord's duty imposed by way of the special relationship
between the landlord and tenant, courts have imposed a contractual duty on
landlords to provide for the tenants' reasonable safety."'4 In Javins v. First
National Realty Corporation,141 the court's analysis focused on the contractual
nature of the modem apartment lease,' 42 and found that the landlord had a
legal obligation of maintenance based upon an implied warranty of
habitability. 43 The Javins court placed the duty to repair and maintain the
premises upon the landlord, the party to the contract who possessed the skill and
unique capacity to perform such services."'
Since Kline, courts have continued to expand the landlord's liability to
tenants."' Rather than enjoying immunity, modem landlords who fail to
safeguard their tenants from foreseeable third-party criminal acts violate an
enforceable duty of protection. By imposing liability upon landlords, courts
have recognized the modem urban landlord's obligations in light of the changing
nature of landlord/tenant relationships.t14
137. Kine, 439 F.2d at 484. The court noted that this unique capacity to protect exists in other
special relationships, such as those between hospital/patient, carrier/passenger, businessman/patron,
employer/employee, landowner/invitee, and school district/pupil. Id. at 482-83.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 483; see aLso Landlord's Duty, supra note 116, at 1168 ("Just as the guest submitted
the security of his person and possessions to the proprietor of the inn, so does the tenant rely upon
the power and responsibility of the landlord.").
140. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1074. The majority found that "leases of urban dwelling units should be interpreted
and construed like any other contract." Id. at 1075. The court discarded the common law notion
of the lease as a conveyance in land, instead finding a lease to be an interest in a place to stay. Id.;
see supra note 104-13 and accompanying text.
143. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077.
144. Id. at 1078-79.
145. See, e.g., Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding the landlord-tenant relationship the basis for liability for failure to repair defective lock);
Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173 (D.C. 1977) (holding landlord liable for common areas, including
defective front door); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975)
(holding landlord liable for failure to initiate precautions to prevent harm from mental patients who
used elevators).
146. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
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C. Modem Approaches to Landlord/Tenant Liability
Modem courts have continued the expansion of landlord liability for third-
party criminal acts that cause injury to tenants. Some courts have based liability
on the special relationship between landlord and tenant, 47 and others have
found that the landlord's duty is based on local statutes.' 4 Whatever the basis
for liability, the trend is toward tenant protectionism.
In Samson v. Saginaw Professional Building, Inc.49 the Michigan
Supreme Court held that an office building landlord owed a duty of protection
to a tenant's employee, who suffered injuries from an attack by a mental patient
in an elevator."5 The court reasoned that the special relationship between the
landlord and tenant was sufficient to require the landlord to protect its
tenants.' 5' Noting that common areas are under the landlord's control, the
court held that the landlord is responsible for ensuring that these areas are
.reasonably safe for the use of ... tenants and invitees."'2
The Alabama Supreme Court moved away from the special relationship as
a basis for liability and found that a landlord's duty to protect the tenant from
third-party criminal acts was imposed by city ordinances .' In Brock v. Watts
Realty Company," the court held that two city Housing Code ordinances' 55
147. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.'
148. See, e.g., Brock v. Watts Realty, 582 So. 2d 438 (Ala. 1991); see also infra note 155 and
accompanying text.
149. 242 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 850.
152. Id. at 849. The well-reasoned dissent noted that landlords generally have no duty to
protect another person even if the landlord has knowledge that such action is necessary. Id. at 852.
Acknowledging that in special relationships one person may have a duty to protect another from the
criminal attack of a third person, the dissent observed that the question of duty turns on policy
considerations. Id. at 854. Further, whether a duty of protection is owed to another person is
mostly a question of fairness. Id. at 852, 854 (quoting Landlord's Duty, supra note 116, at 1180).
153. Brock v. Watts Realty Co., 582 So. 2d 438 (Ala. 1991). The required standard of care
for a reasonable person may be ordained by legislative enactment. Deviation from the standard of
care set by statute may constitute negligence. A statute may, in a sense, impose strict liability upon
a defendant because no excuse for its violation is recognized. By enactment of a statute, the
legislature can reallocate the burden of injuries "upon those who can measurably control their
causes, instead of upon those who are in the main helpless in that regard." St. Louis, Iron Mt., &
S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 296 (1907). Some courts refer to the imposition of such liability
as "negligence per se," and the defendant can avoid liability by neither reasonable ignorance nor
proper care. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 74, at 220, 227; see also Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E.
814 (N.Y. 1920) (holding that the unexcused violation of the safety statute constitutes contributory
negligence per se).
154. 582 So. 2d 438 (Ala. 1991).
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imposed a duty on the landlord to keep the individual apartment door locks in
working order. '" The court reasoned that the murder of a tenant was
foreseeable, even if no prior similar incidents had occurred in the area. 57
Noting that absent foreseeability landlords and businesses are generally not held
liable for third-party criminal acts, the court reasoned: "'We are not willing to
give the landlord one free ride, as it were, and sacrifice the first victim's right
to safety upon the altar of foreseeability. .... ," In so holding, the Brock
court deviated from the long-held common law rule that liability should not be
imposed for criminal acts that the landlord was unable to anticipate.' 59 Rather
than relying on the common law rule, the court looked to the ordinances'
purpose: alleviating the crime problem in residential areas."1'
Many modern courts recognize a landlord's duty to protect tenants from
criminal attacks on the premises and, therefore, impose a duty to employ some
type of security measures.' 6  The cases indicate, however, that courts have
155. The Birmingham Housing Code Ordinances provide:
Sec. 7-1-93 Windows, exterior doors, etc.
Every window, exterior door and basement hatchway shall be reasonably
weathertight, watertight and rodentproof and shall be kept in sound working condition
and good repair. Locks shall be provided on all exterior doors and all exterior openable
windows.
Sec. 7-1-97 Construction, maintenance, etc., generally of facilities, etc.
Every facility, piece of equipment or utility which is required under this article
shall be so constructed or installed that it will function safely and effectively and shall
be maintained in satisfactory working condition.
156. Brock, 582 So. 2d at 441.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 440, 441 (quoting Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210, 1218-19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985)).
159. Brock, 582 So. 2d at 440.
160. The court noted that the two Birmingham Housing Ordinances were enacted pursuant to
Ala. Code 1975, § 11-53-1, which concerns safety, sanitation, and crime in buildings housing
multiple dwellings. Id. The court found compelling the plaintiff's argument that the ordinances
were enacted only to protect tenants from crime; otherwise such laws would be unnecessary. Id.
161. Petersen, supra note 29, at 279 (stating that because a jury decides whether the security
measures were adequate after a criminal attack upon a victim, this may be unfair to a landlord who
has tried in good faith to prevent criminal behavior). See, e.g., Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard,
531 N.E.2d 1358 (111. 1988) (imposing duty upon owner to take precautionary measures); Brichacek
v. Hiskey, 401 N.W.2d 44 (Iowa 1987) (holding that landlord has duty to provide door locks to
protect tenant); Aisner v. Lafayette Towers, 341 N.W.2d 852 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (reversing trial
court's grant of summary judgment where it found that defendant owed no duty because apartment
was not in high risk area and therefore risk was unforeseeable); Johnson v. Harris, 198 N.W.2d 409
(Mich. 1972) (finding that the victim's allegations were enough to raise question for the jury whether
risk was foreseeable); Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1988) (holding that landlord has duty
to protect tenant from dangerous conditions).
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reached opposite extremes in protecting either party's interests. " Because
some courts base liability on the special relationship between the premises owner
and the victim, a closer analysis of the special relationship doctrine will explain
hospital liability for patient injuries from third-party acts.
D. Premises Liability and the Special Relationship Doctrine
A special relationship exists when a person's protection and safety is
entrusted to another." In special relationships, the underlying theory for
imposing an enhanced duty is that one person gives up the ability to protect
himself to another." Some courts have found that such a special relationship
exists between a patient and a hospital, and have based a hospital's duty of
protection from third party criminal acts on this relationship.'
65
Some jurisdictions have combined various special relationships with special
circumstances to find a basis for imposing liability for failure to affirmatively
protect another from injuries resulting from criminal acts." In these
162. Petersen, supra note 29, at 279. See supra note 161; see also Escobar v. Brent General
Hosp., 308 N.W.2d 691 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that hospital that leased house to tenants
owed no duty to prevent unforeseeable criminal assaults).
163. Holland America Cruises, Inc. v. Underwood, 470 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (quoting Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)) (holding that cruise line
had duty to protect its passengers from third party criinal acts because of special relationship).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315, Duty to Control Conduct of Third Persons, that
provides:
There is no duty to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing
physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty
upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a
right to protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965); see also Hanson & Thomas, supra note 20, at 13
(stating that in cases of special relationships, a person relinquishes some ability to protect oneself
to the control of another).
164. Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Tenn. 1975) (stating that jurisdictions have
combined various special relationships with certain conditions and circumstances to find liability for
failure to protect another from criminal acts resulting in harm). But see Wright v. Webb, 362
S.E.2d 919, 920-21 (Va. 1987) (declining to impose liability on motel/dinner theater owner for
patron's injuries caused by third party, despite special relationship).
165. Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Ala. 1992); Stropes v. Heritage
House Children's Ctr., 547 N.E.2d 244, 251 (Ind. 1989).
166. Compropst, 528 S.W.2d at 192; see also Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386
(Ala. 1992) (stating that hospital has special relationship to patient); Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts
Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (deciding that landlord has duty to protect
tenants from criminal acts because of special relationship between landlord and tenant); Wright v.
Webb, 362 S.E.2d 919,922 (Va. 1987) (citing Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690 (Va. 1921)) (deciding
that common carrier must use high degree of care to protect passengers).
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jurisdictions, the person in control has a duty to reasonably protect the other
from the foreseeable criminal attacks of third parties. 67 Unforeseeable,
sudden, and unexpected violent acts by a third party, however, may not lead to
the imposition of liability.' 68 The Second Restatement of Torts, section 314A
establishes examples of different special relationships that give rise to a duty to
protect.6 Examples of these special relationships are common carrier/
passenger,170 innkeeper/guest, '' and land possessor/invitee. 11
As just stated, one special relationship is the innkeeper/guest
relationship.' " The common law requires innkeepers to provide guests with
167. Compropst, 528 S.W.2d at 192; see also Freeman v. St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr.,
548 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding a hospital liable for a patient who was raped
while in multiple restraints while in emergency room, because the hospital's duty was commensurate
with patient's ability to protect self); but see Virginia M. Chock & Leslie H. Kondo, Note, Knodle
v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc.: Imposing a Duty to Protect Against Third Party Criminal Conduct
on the Premises, 11 U. HAW. L. REV., 231, 242 (1989) (citing Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel,
Inc., 742 P.2d 377 (Haw. 1987)) (Hawaii has not recognized the landlord/tenant relationship as one
where an unquestionable duty arises, and until 1987, Hawaii had not imposed a duty upon
innkeepers to protect guests because of a special relationship).
168. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
169. Section 314A provides:
Special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are
ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to members of
the public who enter in response to his invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another
under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for
protection is under a similar duty to the other.
RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
Section 314A includes a caveat that there may be other relations that would require the
imposition of a duty. Another relationship listed in comment a to § 314A that would give rise to
a special relationship includes that of employer/employee.
170. For discussion of common carrier/passenger and third-party crime, see generally Sonja
A. Soehnel, Annotation, Liability of Land Carrier to Passenger Who Becomes Victim of Third
Pary's Assault on or About Carrier's Vehicle or Premises, 34 A.L.R.4th 1054 (1984).
171. See, e.g., Virginia D. v. Madesco Inv. Corp., 648 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1983) (deciding that
a hotel operator is in a special relationship with its guests and therefore owes an affirmative duty of
protection); see generally Annotation, Liability of Hotel or Motel Operator for Injury to Guest
Resuling from Assault by Third Party, 28 A.L.R.4th 80 (1984) (discussing the special relationship
doctrine).
172. See, e.g., Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing how
duty to protect business invitees can arise in situations where a special relationship exists).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965); Chock & Kondo, supra note 167, at
241 ("It is well established under the common law that there is a special legal relationship between
innkeepers and registered guests.").
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a higher standard of care than the average premises owner. 174  Innkeepers
have generally had a duty to protect guests from third-party assaults by
exercising reasonable care.'" Liability is imposed as a matter of law, based
upon either the innkeeper's direct control of the premises or upon the contract
right a guest expects (i.e., comfort and safety) in return for money. 76 This
last theory rests on the assumption that, among other things, the guest is paying
for a safe place to stay.'"
Another special relationship that gives rise to a duty to protect is between
a common carrier and its passengers.'" In Stropes v. Heritage House
Children's Center,"7 the court analogized the common carrier/passenger
relationship to that of health facility/patient, noting the extraordinary standard
of care that Indiana courts had imposed on common carriers. The common
carrier's imposed liability is based upon the control and autonomy that the
174. Kline v. 1500Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Chock & Kondo, supra note 167, at 241. "Innkeepers have been held to operate under a rigorous
liability standard, 'approaching that of an insurer against all dangers save acts of God.'" Id.
(quoting Kveragas v. Scottish Inns, Inc., 733 F.2d 409, 412 (6th Cir. 1984)); Steve M. Tumblin,
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 95, 139 (1986) (stating that most
jurisdictions traditionally imposed a duty that was greater than one of reasonable care for protecting
guests' property, but required a showing of negligence to hold the innkeeper liable for guests'
physical injury); but see Virginia D. v. Madesco Inv. Corp., 648 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Mo. 1983)
(holding that an innkeepers duty is only one of ordinary care).
175. Kline, 439 F.2d at 482.
176. Id.
177. Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 186 A.2d 291, 292 (N.J. 1962); see also Chock & Kondo,
supra note 167, at 241 (stating that duty is based onthe reasoning that the guest is paying for the
innkeeper's implied or explicit suggestion of a safe overnight stay); Richard L. Small, The
Landowner/Occupier's Duty to Prevent Assaults by Third Parties, MICH. BAR J., Jan. 1989, at 34
(stating that the substantive item that the guest is paying for is a safe place to stay).
178. Kline v. 1500Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(holding that a carrier-passenger is one of the relationships in which the law imposes a special duty
of care); Holland Am. Cruises, Inc. v. Underwood, 470 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that a common carrier is required to use the highest degree of care reasonably demanded
to protect passengers); Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 186 A.2d 291, 294 (N.J. 1962) (deciding that
common carriers have a duty to use a "high degree of care to protect the persons of their patrons");
Wright v. Webb, 362. S.E. 2d 919, 921 (Va. 1987) (holding that a common carrier has a duty to
exercise a high degree of care in protecting passengers). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314A (1965); see also D. Mark Collins, The Business Inviter's Duty to Protect Invitees
from Third-Pary Criminal Attacks on the Premises: An Overview and the Law in South Dakota
After Small v. McKennan Hosp., 33 S.D. L. REv. 90, 93 (1988) (noting that certain relationships
have been the basis on which courts have imposed a duty to protect).
179. 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1989). In Stropes, a children's center employee raped a mentally
retarded fourteen-year-old resident. The Indiana Supreme Court noted that it has extended the
principles underlying the common carrier standard to reach other enterprises. Id. at 252.
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passenger surrenders during the period of accommodation.s Some courts
have imposed a duty on common carriers to use the highest degree of care for
their passengers. '' Nevertheless, not all courts require the common carrier
to anticipate unforeseeable criminal acts,"s and hold the carrier liable only if
the criminal acts were foreseeable.'S3
The relationship of a business invitor to its invitees has caused some courts
difficulty in determining the business' duty to protect.184 Although special
status has been bestowed on business invitees in some circumstances, no special
relationship has been traditionally recognized that would impose a duty to protect
the invitee from third-party criminal acts.' The scope of the business
invitor's duty to prevent third party criminal assaults on its invitees has been the
issue of much litigation in the last decade.sa
Like private individuals, business invitors have traditionally had no duty to
180. Id. The Stropes court listed two reasons for applying the concept of control as a basis for
imposing liability upon common carriers. Id. (citing Rabon v. Guardsmark, Inc., 571 F.2d 1277
(4th Cir. 1978)). First, the contract between a carrier and a passenger contains the implied
assurance of the passenger's safety. Id. Second, the trust of his safety that a passenger places in
the hands of the common carrier imposes special duties upon the common carrier, like a bailor
entrusted with goods. Id. at 253.
181. See, e.g., Holland Am. Cruises, Inc. v. Underwood, 470 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (quoting Whitman v. Red Top Sedan Serv., 219 So. 2d 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)).
182. See, e.g., Wright v. Webb, 362 S.E.2d 919, 921 (Va. 1987) (deciding that, under
ordinary circumstances, it would be hard for the premises owner to anticipate an intentional criminal
attack); Connell's Ex'rs v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 24 S.E. 467, 470-71 (Va. 1896) (stating
that a passenger murdered on a train is an unforeseeable act). In Connell's, the court reasoned:
It is better that the carrier should be held responsible to a passenger for injuries received
at the hands of an intruder, a stranger, or a fellow passenger only in those cases where
its agents or employees knew, or in the light of surrounding circumstances, ought to
have known, that danger threatened or was to be apprehended ... than that the hitherto
recognized limits of responsibility for negligent acts should be enlarged, and the carrier
be held to answer for a casualty wholly unforeseen ....
Connell's, 24 S.E. 467, 470-71 (Va. 1896).
183. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., McNeal v. Henry, 266 N.W.2d 469 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a store
owner owed no duty to an invitee to prevent a shooting); Small, supra note 177, at 35 (noting that
Michigan courts have had difficulty with the issue of imposing a duty of protection upon business
owners for their invitees, because in spite of the special status that business invitees have historically
enjoyed, the relationship itself between owner and invitee has not traditionally been the basis for a
duty of protection from criminal assaults).
185. Small, supra note 177, at 35 (stating that Michigan courts have struggled with the issue
of the business owner's liability); Wright v. Webb, 362 S.E.2d 919, 921 (Va. 1987).
186. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs 477 n. 1
(1988).
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protect their patrons from criminal harm on the premises."s Courts have
therefore been unwilling to impose a duty to protect, absent special
circumstances. " Five policy reasons are advanced for the reluctance to
impose liability on business invitors.sa First, the judiciary is reluctant to
interfere with the common law rule. Second, it is believed that the intentional
criminal acts of a third person are a superseding, intervening cause of the harm.
Third, criminal acts are often unforeseeable. Fourth, because business owners
are unclear about the standard of care to which they will be held, they suffer an
economic burden resulting from imposed liability based on unclear standards of
care. Finally, there is the conflicting policy of government-provided police
protection versus private police protection. " The duty a business invitor
owes to an invitee who enters for business purposes is one of reasonable care
to assure a reasonably safe premises.'
187. See, e.g., Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (deciding that
although business owners have no duty to protect others from third-party criminal attacks, special
circumstances may cause an exception to the general rule); Genovay v. Fox, 143 A.2d 229 (N. J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958) (not requiring a business person to take precautions that are clearly
unreasonable); Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975) (deciding that shopping center
owners owed no duty to guard against third-party criminal acts unless they knew or had reason to
know criminal acts were about to occur); Wright v. Webb, 362 S.E.2d 919 (Va. 1987) (deciding
that motel/dinner theater parking lot owners owed patrons a duty of reasonable care, but had no duty
to protect invitees from third-party assaults); Collins, supra note 178, at 93 (noting that, absent
extenuating circumstances, business owners owe no duty to provide protective security measures for
patrons); Harris & Gilbertson, supra note 89, at 14 (noting that business owners owed no duty to
protect persons from criminal harm while on their premises); Small, supra note 177, at 32 (stating
that, generally, premises owner owes no duty to prevent third-party intentional acts).
188. See, e.g., Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975) (deciding that various
special relationships have led to the imposition of liability upon the landowner); Wright v. Webb,
362 S.E.2d 919, 922 (Va. 1987) (citing Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690 (Va. 1921)) (distinguishing
business invitee from passenger-business invitee does not entrust safety to invitor as passenger does
to common carrier); Yelnosky, supra note 19, at 883 (stating that despite the trend to impose duty,
many jurisdictions continue to refuse to impose a duty to protect).
189. See, e.g., McNeal v. Henry, 266 N.W.2d 469 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978), where the court
refused to impose liability upon a store owner for a customer's death that resulted from a third
party's criminal acts. Affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant-store
owner, the court reasoned that "[asa a matter of policy, we do not believe that commercial
businesses should be required to answer for the type of bizarre consequence faced by defendant in
this case, even though plaintiff's complaint clearly and correctly characterized plaintiff herself as a
business invitee." Id. at 470. The court noted that both large and small businesses located in most
urban communities cannot bear the oppressive insurance burden that imposition of liability for failure
to protect business patrons would require. Id. Further, although the store had a duty of reasonable
care to protect its patrons, it had not assumed a duty to protect the plaintiff from the criminal's
extraordinary unforeseeable behavior. Id.
190. Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Harris & Gilbertson,
supra note 89, at 14.
191. Genovayv. Fox, 143 A.2d 229, 234 (citing Brody v. Albert Lifson& Sons, 111 A.2d 504
(N.J. 1955)) (deciding that an owner of premises where the public is invited owes duty of reasonable
care to provide a reasonably safe place to conduct business); see also McNeal v. Henry, 266
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Exceptions to the general rule of no duty exist, and courts have offered
differing rationales for imposing liability upon the business invitor.'" Some
courts impose liability upon the business invitor if the criminal attack was
reasonably foreseeable. 193 Many courts have interpreted section 344 of the
Second Restatement of Torts as a basis for expanding a business invitor's duty
to protect its invitees.194 Still other courts impose a duty to protect if the
N.W.2d 469 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (deciding that a store owner owes duty of reasonable care to
its invitees).
192. Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (deciding that a business
owner generally owes a duty to make premises safe for customers, and under special circumstances
the business owner owes a duty to protect a customer from criminal attack); Harris & Gilbertson,
supra note 89, at 14 (stating that one justification for imposing liability is the increase in the nation's
crime rate); Small, supra note 177, at 32 (noting that courts have based exception to no duty on
existence of special relationship or special circumstances, or on the court's perception of public
policy); Yelnosky, supra note 19, at 889 (noting that some courts explain exceptions as based on
fairness or reluctance to make business inviter an insurer of safety). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 & cmt. f.
193. See, e.g., Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36 (N.C. 1981) (holding
shopping mall owners liable for a female plaintiff's assault in mall parking lot, even though general
rule is no duty to ensure safety of patrons, because the assault was foreseeable since 29 incidents
of assault occurred in the preceding year).
194. Harris & Gilbertson, supra note 89, at 15. See also Yelnosky, supra note 19, at 898
(noting that acceptance of the Restatement approach has facilitated plaintiff's ability to not only prove
that the premises owner breached its duty to protect, but also to get before the jury the pivotal
question of the premises owner's breach of the duty).
Section 344 provides:
Business Premises Open to Public: Acts of Third Persona or Animals
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes
is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a
purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful
acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise
reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to
protect them against it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965).
Comment f provides:
Duty to police premises. Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he
is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know
that the acts of the third person are occurring, or about to occur. He may, however,
know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct
on the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the
visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular
individual. If the place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that
he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons,
either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions
against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a
reasonable protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965).
Yelnosky suggests that, because comment f makes the premises owner's duty contingent upon
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business provides a climate that attracts criminals. 195
Courts have issued conflicting results and standards as they have struggled
to balance the competing interests of parties" within a special relationship
when the dependent party has been injured by a third party. As with other
special relationships, courts have also struggled with the hospital/patient
relationship when patients have been injured by third-party criminal acts.
Although not specifically included in section 314A, the hospital/patient
relationship has been recognized by many courts as a special relationship that
imposes a duty of protection."9
V. COURT RESPONSES TO THE PATIENT VICrIMIzATION PROBLEM
Having established that hospitals are being held to a duty of protection from
third-party criminal acts in many jurisdictions," an analysis of the various
standards of care and their application is necessary. The courts have not
developed a clear test or analysis that applies to third-party premises liability.
Several states have addressed the problem of hospital liability for patient
victimization with conflicting results.'" Three standards have emerged in
third-party premises liability cases: the ordinary or reasonable care under the
circumstances standard,' the foreseeability of criminal activities standard,"'
notice of some kind, its use of the phrase "know or have reason to know* greatly increases the
conditions that may comprise adequate notice. Yelnosky, supra note 19, at 897-98. This reading
of notice is overbroad, however, and does not give the premises owner enough of a standard on
which to rely. Note also that comment f begins with the common law notion of no duty and
expresses that the "possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965).
195. Yeinosky, supra note 19, at 891 (noting that no duty to protect arises unless the inviter's
premises provide an attraction or unique climate for crime). Certain structures associated with
businesses have been distinguished as being inherently dangerous places. For example, some courts
have noted the dangerousness of parking facilities and the risks associated with their operation.
Friedman & Worthington, supra note 100, at 286 (citing Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695
P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985)); Gomez v. Ticor, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (business patron
fatally shot when he inadvertently observed an armed robbery while enroute to his car in parking
garage).
196. The parties' interests are competing because the dependent party wants protection, and in
many instances the owner does not want to pay for protection. Additionally, the dependent party
does not want the owner to charge more for the product or service when the owner provides
protection.
197. See, e.g., Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386 (Ala. 1992) (deciding that a
hospital owed a duty of protection to a sedated patient because of the special relationship that existed
between the hospital and patient).
198. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 200-69 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 203-27 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 228-53 and accompanying text.
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and the special relationship between the hospital and its patient standard.'
The following case is illustrative of the reasonable care under the circumstances
standard.
A. Reasonable Care Under the Circumstances Standard
The Minnesota Supreme Court decided the seminal case in hospital
premises liability 3  when it applied the reasonable care under the
circumstances standard in Sylvester v. Northwestern Hospital. 04 The Sylvester
court held that, although a private hospital is not an insurer of patient safety, it
"must exercise such reasonable care for the protection and well-being of a
patient as his known physical and mental condition requires or as is required by
his condition as it ought to be known to the hospital in the exercise of ordinary
care. "W The Minnesota high court further held that the hospital's reasonable
care must bear some relation to the patient's incapacity to care for his own
safety, but would not require the hospital to take precautions to avoid dangers
202. See infra notes 254-70 and accompanying text.
203. Sylvester v. Northwestern Hosp., 53 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1952). In ylvester, a patient
recovering from an appendectomy was physically assaulted by another patient who was wandering
around the hospital in an intoxicated condition. Id. at 18. The evidence showed that the same
patient who assaulted the patient-victim had wandered into the patient-victim's room on other
occasions while drunk. Id. at 19. The court imposed liability even though the plaintiff-victim failed
to present evidence that the assailant had the reputation of being a violent drunk; rather, the hospital
was liable because it either knew or should have known that the assailant was drunk on this
occasion. Id.
204. 53 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1952). The Minnesota Court of Appeals adhered to the reasonable
care under the circumstances standard in Roettger v. United Hosp., 380 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986). In Roetger, the female patient was physically assaulted by a male intruder only one
day after she had given birth. Id. at 858. Visitors reported that the intruder acted strangely in a
visitor's lounge on another floor minutes before the attack on Mrs. Roettger. Id. The court held
that the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the hospital's failure to provide sufficient
security was a substantial factor in the patient's injuries. Id. at 862.
The substantial factor that the Roenger court based liability upon is the key to third-party tort
liability. Here, although the intruder directly caused Mrs. Roettger's injuries, the hospital was held
liable for its failure to provide adequate security to prevent the intruder's criminal act. By imposing
liability, the court recognized that the hospital owed a duty to protect its patients from a third party's
intentional criminal acts. Although in Sylvester the criminal assailant was a patient, and in Roetger
the criminal assailant was an intruder, the courts did not make this distinction. The hospital,
therefore, has a duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances to protect its patients from any
third-party criminal acts. Roetger, 380 N.W.2d at 862; see also Freeman v. St. Clare's Hosp. &
Health Ctr., 548 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (deciding that a hospital has a duty of
reasonable care to protect patients from third-party injury, and thus the hospital was liable when a
patient in multiple restraints in the emergency room was raped by another patient).
205. Sylvester, 53 N.W.2d at 19. The court defined reasonable care as the care a reasonably
prudent person would exercise, given the same or similar circumstances. Id. (citing WiLLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (1st ed. 1941)).
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that a reasonable person would not anticipate.'
The Minnesota Supreme Court based its holding on the assaulter's being
seen, on other occasions, roaming the hospital intoxicated. Thus, the hospital
knew that he might cause harm to a patient.' The court found that the.
hospital was liable for the patient-victim's injuries even though it could not have
foreseen the particular injury.'
The North Carolina Court of Appeals followed the reasonable care under
the circumstances standard announced in Sylvester,' yet it reached a different
result. In Burns v. Forsyth County Hospital Authority, Inc. ,2' a patient who
was heavily sedated following a myelogram2" was injured when another
patient threw a chair across the room and hit him.2"2 Focusing on the patient's
entrant status, 21 3 the Burns court found that the injured patient was an invitee
and, therefore, the hospital owed a duty to exercise ordinary care to assure
reasonably safe premises.2"4 The court reasoned that the hospital is not an
insurer of patient safety, nor is it required to take such precautions as will
hinder its business operations. 215  Although the Burns2 '6 court found no
liability, the court recognized that hospitals have a duty to protect their patients
from foreseeable assaults by others.2"7 In affirming the jury verdict for the
defendant-hospital, the court noted that the jury decided the threshold issue when
it determined that the hospital did not have adequate notice of an unsafe
206. Sylvester, 53 N.W.2d at 19. The Sylvester court found the hospital liable based on its duty
to exercise reasonable cam to have known of the assaulter's dangerous and violent tendencies. Id.;
see also Burns v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 344 S.E.2d 839 (N.C. App. 1986) (deciding that
a hospital is not an insurer of patient safety, and thus is not required to take such precautions as will
hinder its business operations).
207. Sylvester, 53 N.W.2d at 19.
208. Id. at 20 (citing Knight v. Powers Dry Goods Co., 30 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. 1948)) (finding
for a defendant store owner when a plaintiff was knocked down by an escaping shoplifter, because
the store owner could not reasonably foresee that the shoplifter possessed vicious tendencies).
209. 53 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1952).
210. 344 S.E.2d 839 (NC. App. 1986).
211. A myelogram is a diagnostic x-ray taken after a radiopaque dye is injected into the spinal
canal. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 917 (5th ed. 1982).
212. Burns, 344 S.E.2d at 842.
213. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
214. Bums, 344 S.E.2d at 846.
215. Id.
216. Bums v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 344 S.E.2d 839 (N.C. App. 1986).
217. Id. at 847. In this case, the hospital owed its patients a duty to protect them from assaults
by other patients. Nevertheless, the court held that, because the jury previously returned a verdict
for the defendant-hospital, it decided that the hospital had no notice of an unsafe condition and
therefore had no duty to prevent injury. Id.
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condition. 218 The hospital's duty of care toward its patients, as articulated by
the court, was limited to only those unsafe conditions of which the hospital had
notice. 
2 1 9
In another decision based upon the reasonable care under the circumstances
standard, the New York Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict for an injured
patient when it found that the defendant-hospital was negligent in its failure to
take safety measures to prevent unauthorized persons from obtaining dangerous
hospital instruments.' In Clinton v. City of New York, the court held that the
jury's finding of negligence was proper, based on the hospital's failure to take
safety measures to avert a patient's access to hospital instruments. 22'
The Clinton court found that the hospital's duty was one of reasonable care
in protecting its patients frbm harm inflicted by others.' Reasonableness,
according to the Clinton court, is "measured by the capacity of the patient to
218. Burns, 344 S.E.2d at 847. Plaintiff's appeal was based in part on the following
instructions given to the jury:
The plaintiff contends and the defendant denies that the defendant was negligent in that
the defendant knew or should have known that the patient Daniel Moore was dangerous
or might reasonably be expected to be dangerous to other patients and that the defendant
failed to use ordinary and reasonable care by allowing the patient Daniel Moore to be
placed in the room with the plaintiff and or by failing to remove the patient Daniel
Moore from the room of the plaintiff.
Id. (quoting jury instructions from trial record). The court held that the defendant hospital was not
negligent in its failure to read through the medical records that were transferred with the patient from
a mental health facility, which contained information regarding Daniel Moore's condition. Id. at
846. The Burns court stated, "It is overly burdensome to impose a legal duty upon defendant to
read through the entire medical records of all referrals." Id. at 845. The court accordingly held
that the exclusion of the medical records was proper. Id. However, had the hospital taken the time
and effort to read the three pages of notes that the referring physician sent, the hospital may have
been held to have had notice of Mr. Moore's violent tendencies, and therefore Mr. Bums' injuries
may have been prevented. Id.
219. Id. at 846. The court noted that notice of an assault could be ascertained from evidence
of a bad temper in the past. Id. (citing Wegner v. Delly-Land Delicatessen, Inc., 153 S.E.2d 804,
807 (N.C. 1967)).
220. Clinton v. City of New York, 528 N.Y.S.2d 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). In Clinton, the
plaintiff-patient was injured when another patient repeatedly stabbed her. Id. at 109. The attacker
had apparently obtained and hidden suture scissors in her bedside drawer, and used them to attack
the plaintiff. Id. In contrast to the court in Bums v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 344 S.E.2d 839
(N.C. Ct. App. 1986), where the court based its liability determination on the patient's entrant
classification, the Clinton court did not consider whether the patient was an invitee. Instead, the
CQinton court focused on the hospital's duty to keep unsafe instruments from other patients. Clinton,
528 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
221. C/inton, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 109. Additionally, as in Sylvester v. Northwestern Hosp., 53
N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1952), the Clinton court did not distinguish those criminal actors who are
patients from those who are intruders when determining the hospital's liability. Id.
222. Clinton, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 108. By so holding, the Clinton court reaffirmed the standard
first articulated in Sylvester v. Northwestern Hosp., 53 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1952).
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provide for his or her own safety. "3 On the issue of foreseeability, the court
noted that where the intentional, intervening act of another is foreseeable, the
hospital will be held liable if it fails to prevent the act.' u Thus, because a
patient stealing scissors was a foreseeable act, the hospital was liableA
5
The above cases demonstrate how courts have reached differing conclusions
while applying the same standards. The reasonable care under the circumstances
standard gives courts, juries, and hospitals only the broadest guidelines to
follow.2' Hospitals are left uncertain as to the conclusion a jury or court will
reach when applying the reasonable care under the circumstances standard,
223. Burs, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 109 (citing Killeen v. State of New York, 498 N.Y.S.2d 358
(N.Y. 1985)); Mochen v. State of New York, 396 N.Y.S.2d 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). In
Roettger- v. United Hosp., 380 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), the court determined
reasonableness by such factors as the hospital's knowledge of its patient's physical and mental
condition. Id. at 859.
224. Clinton, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 109 (quoting Kush v. City of Buffalo, 462 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.
1983)). The hospital adduced evidence at trial that suture scissors are among the instruments that
are normally kept locked. Contrast this holding with that of the court in Burns v. Forsyth County
Hosp. Auth., 344 S.E.2d 839 (N.C. App. 1986), where the court held that the hospital did not have
notice of an unsafe condition when a patient, transferred from a mental institution, threw a chair and
hit a sedated patient. Bums, 344 S.E.2d at 844. In Clinton, the court had no notice that a patient
would obtain suture scissors from a locked cabinet, yet the hospital was held liable because the court
determined that the assailant's intentional, intervening act was foreseeable. Clinton, 528 N.Y.S.2d
at 109.
225. The dissent maintained that a hospital's negligence cannot be inferred simply because a
patient was injured. Clinton, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 109. To prove negligence, a patient must prove that
a breach of the hospital's duty caused the injuries. Id. The patient must also prove that the injury
was foreseeable. Id. Here, the hospital produced evidence that it kept instruments in a locked
cabinet. Id. The patient failed to prove that the assailant obtained the scissors from the hospital,
and the dissent noted that such suture scissors were available from other places outside the hospital.
Id. In urging that the assault was an intervening, superseding act that caused the plaintiff-patient's
injuries, the dissent observed that the hospital could neither have foreseen nor done more to avert
the assault under the circumstances. Id. at 109-10; see also supra note 204 and accompanying text.
The dissent was correct in its reasoning that because a patient has possession of suture scissors does
not mean that the hospital was negligent. Here, the court went too far in finding that the attacker's
act was foreseeable. With such reasoning, every hospital that uses sharp instruments would be liable
under the Clinton court's notion of foreseeability.
226. Henderson, supra note 91, at 468. Professor Henderson states:
The reforms and changes in the law of negligence in recent years have, purportedly to
advance identifiable social objectives, eliminated much of the specificity with which
negligence principles traditionally have been formulated. We are rapidly approaching
the day when liability will be determined routinely on a case by case, "under all the
circumstances" basis, with decision makers (often juries) guided only by the broadest
of general principles. When that day arrives, the retreat from the rule of law will be
complete, principled decision will have been replaced with decision by whim, and the
common law of negligence will have degenerated into an unjustifiably inefficient, thinly
disguised lottery.
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because juries determine the standard on a case-by-case basis.2" This leaves
hospitals uncertain as to which standard a court will apply, and also as to the
result a jury will reach.
B. Foreseeability of Criminal Activities Standard
In a negligence cause of action, the plaintiff must prove four elements:
duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.' The determination of the
foreseeability of a third party's actions falls under the duty and causation
analysis2  and has caused some confusing results to issue from the courts.'
Some states have followed the common law as set forth in the Second
Restatement of Torts, which relieves the premises owner from liability for third
party criminal acts.? Other states have applied the prior similar acts test to
227. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. The collective jury verdict disguises the
difficulty in applying the concept of "reasonableness' to a particular case's facts. Courts must
realize that the interests at stake "are too important to be left to decision by intuition, or by whim."
Henderson, supra note 91, at 479-80. A Michigan court gave the following jury instruction in a
case where a theater patron was shot while on the theater's premises by a stranger:
Now, in considering whether there was an act of negligence, the law provides that when
a person is invited on the premises of a business he is a business invitee, and the person
doing the inviting has a certain duty to that individual. That duty is, in this state, to use
reasonable care for the safety of that person. Now, it is going to be up to you to
determine what are the requirements of using reasonable care for the safety of the
Plaintiff ....
Earle v. Colonial Theater Co., 266 N.W.2d 466, 467-68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
228. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
229. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 74, at 274-75.
230. Friedman & Worthington, supra note 100, at 268 (noting that the foreseeability
determination in premises liability litigation, under the duty or proximate cause analysis, has been
troublesome for courts and litigators to determine). See, e.g., Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial
Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985) (applying the totality of the circumstances test); C.S. v. Sophir,
368 N.W.2d 444 (Neb. 1985) (applying the prior similar acts rule); Small v. McKennan Hosp., 403
N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1987) (abandoning the prior similar acts test and applying the totality of the
circumstances test).
231. Section 448 provides:
INTENTIONALLY TORT1OUS OR CRIMINAL ACTS DONE UNDER OPPORTUNITY
AFFORDED BY ACTOR'S NEGLIGENCE
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding
cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct
created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such a
tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should
have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a third
person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
Comment a to § 448 is instructive:
The rule stated in this section applies when the actor's conduct creates a situation which
is utilized by a third person to inflict intentional harm upon another or provides a
temptation to do so to which the third person yields, but the actor has no reason to
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determine foreseeability, 2 but this test has been largely abandoned in favor
of the totality of the circumstances test. 3 Still other courts have relied on the
existence of a special relationship on which to base foreseeability analysis.'
Recent cases reveal that courts are moving toward the totality of the
circumstances or the special relationship tests to decide the foreseeability
issue. 
s
The California Supreme Court abandoned the prior similar acts" rule in
favor of the totality of the circumstances rule in Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial
Hospital.1"  In Isaacs,'  a doctor was shot in the hospital parking lot as he
expect that the third person would so act. Under the rule stated in this Section, the
actor is not responsible for the harm thus inflicted merely because the situation which
his negligence has created has afforded an opportunity or temptation for its infliction.
Id. at cmt. a.
Texas followed the Restatement approach. See, e.g., Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., 690
S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) (affirming grant of summary judgment for apartment interests because
attack on ten-year-old girl who was abducted from apartment complex was not foreseeable; Texas
Supreme Court reversed by finding a duty on other grounds); see also Hanson & Thomas, supra
note 20, at 12.
232. See, e.g., C.S. v. Sophir, 368 N.W.2d 444 (Neb. 1985) (upholding summary judgment
for defendant property owner notwithstanding occurrence of identical incident two months prior).
The prior similar acts rule states that "in the absence of prior similar incidents, an owner of land
is not bound to anticipate the criminal activities of third persons, particularly where the wrongdoer
was a complete stranger to both the landowner and the victim and where the criminal activity leading
to the injury came about precipitously." Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658
(Cal. 1985) (quoting Wingard v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 176 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).
With this rule, a hospital would not be held liable for a patient's injuries if no prior similar criminal
acts occurred on the hospital's premises.
233. See Isaacs v. HuntingtonMemorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985); Small v. McKennan
Hosp., 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1987). See infra notes 237-51 and accompanying text. The Isaacs
court abandoned the prior similar acts rule because it found that the rule violated public policy in
several aspects. Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 658. First, application of the rule discouraged premises owners
from taking measures to prevent fiture harm. Id. Secondly, the first victim loses under the prior
similar acts rule, but subsequent victims may recover. Id. Third, application of the rule leads to
arbitrary results, because of uncertainty as to how "similar" any prior incidents should be, and how
close in time an incident must be for it to be considered a prior similar act. Id. at 658-59. Fourth,
the rule considers the foreseeability of a particular act as equivalent to previous occurrences of
similar acts. Id. at 659. Lastly, application of the prior similar acts rule takes too many cases away
from the jury's consideration. Id.
234. See, e.g., Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386 (Ala. 1992) (noting that special
relationship between hospital and patient gives rise to duty to protect).
235. See, e.g., Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386 (Ala. 1992) (special relationship
test); Isaacs v. HuntingtonMemorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985) (totality of the circumstances
test).
236. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
237. 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985).
238. Id.
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was about to enter his car.239 Dr. Isaacs brought a negligence action against
the hospital, alleging that the hospital breached its duty by failing to provide
adequate security to protect him from a third party's criminal acts.' The
California Supreme Court, observing that the prior similar acts rule led to "one
free assault" for the premises owner," rejected that test on policy grounds
and applied the totality of the circumstances test.' The totality of the
circumstances test takes into account such factors as the surrounding area and
the prevalence of crime there, the environmental conditions in the area, and
other evidence, in addition to any prior similar acts.2 3  The Isaacs court
reversed and remanded the case, holding that there remained a question of fact
as to the foreseeability of the incident, and that a foreseeability determination
should be made by a jury. 4
The Isaacs" decision is important to the analysis of premises owner
liability because it leaves hospitals even more uncertain as to how foreseeability
will be measured. Hospitals in jurisdictions that follow this approach may not
be given the notice of a prior similar act on hospital premises before a jury
decides that the hospital had a duty to protect its patients.' Additionally, the
239. Id. at 655. Dr. Isaacs left the building at about 10:00 p.m., accompanied by his wife and
a friend. His car was parked across the street from the hospital's emergency room.
240. Id.
241. Under the prior similar acts rule, "the first victim always loses, while subsequent victims
are permitted recovery." Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 658. The Isaacs court noted that such a result is both
unfair and goes against the policy of victim compensation. Id.
242. Id. at 658, 661. The court held that "foreseeability is determined in light of all the
circumstances and not by a rigid application of a mechanical 'prior similars' rule." Id. at 659. See
supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
243. Id. at 659, 661. Although prior incidents similar in nature to the instant crime may help
establish foreseeability, they are not required for such a finding. Id. at 661.
244. Id. at 665. In so holding, the Isaacs court determined that the trial court erred when it
concluded that, as a matter of law, the assault was unforeseeable. Id. at 662. The South Dakota
Supreme Court followed the Isaacs decision in Small v. McKennan Hosp., 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D.
1987), where the court abandoned the prior similar acts rule in favor of the totality of the
circumstances rule. The facts in Small were similar to those in Isaacs, except the victim in Small
was murdered in the hospital's parking garage. The Small court, like the Isaacs court, rejected the
prior similar acts rule both on policy grounds and on the grounds that courts had difficulty in
applying the prior similar acts rule. This difficulty stemmed from different interpretations as to what
constituted "similar," and different definitions as to time and territory limits in determining
foreseeability. Small, 403 N.W.2d at 412.
245. 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985).
246. Moreover, to add to a hospital's uncertainty, a court could find that hospitals might be put
on notice of similar incidents in other hospitals. The problem with this analysis is: Where does a
court draw the line? Would a hospital be held to have had prior notice if a rape occurred at another
hospital in the same town? The same county? What about different violent crimes-would they
provide the same notice? Since courts have not given hospitals consistent and uniform standards,
the answers are unknown. Therefore, hospitals are left without knowing how a court will view a
given standard.
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Isaacs'A standard failed to set out exactly what factors the jury should
consider when determining the foreseeability of a criminal act; the court found
only that all the circumstances of a particular case will be considered.' The
Isaacs 9 standard also failed to inform hospitals as to the weight each factor
would be given in determining foreseeability. For instance, would evidence of
prior crimes on the premises be given more weight by a jury than a hospital's
location in a high-crime area? Hospitals will not get the answers from the
totality of the circumstances test.
Another reason that the Isaacs decision is important in hospital premises
liability cases is that it involved a plaintiff who was a doctor rather than a
patient.' The doctor in Isaacs was mobile and presumably not hindered by
illness or disability and, therefore, was capable of defending himself; yet the
court found that the hospital owed him a duty of protection." Many hospital
patients, by contrast, are incapable of defending themselves because of illness,
disability, or medications, and must therefore rely on the hospital to look after
their safety. 2  The situation of helpless patients has caused some courts to
apply the special relationship test in premises liability cases."
C. Special Relationship Between Hospital and Patient Standard
The Alabama Supreme Court used a different approach to determine a
hospital's liability for third-party crime directed at its patients when it recently
addressed this issue in a case of first impression.' In Young v. Huntsville
Hospital,2'" the Alabama Supreme Court held that, because of the "special
247. Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 653.
248. See infra notes 317-34 and accompanying text.
249. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 659 (Cal. 1985).
250. Id. at 655.
251. Id. at 662. See infra notes 254-62 and accompanying text. Because he practiced at the
hospital, Dr. Isaacs was more familiar with his surroundings than most patients are who are
hospitalized.
252. See supra notes 163-97 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386 (Ala. 1992). See infra notes 254-
72 and accompanying text.
254. Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Ala. 1992).
255. Id. at 1386. In Young, a female patient was admitted into the hospital to undergo
treatment for kidney stones. Id. at 1387. While she lay in her bed, sedated by the effects of pain
medication, an intruder entered her hospital room and sexually assaulted her. Id.; see supra note
2 and accompanying text. The assault occurred at approximately 6:00 a.m., four hours before
posted visiting hours were to begin. Id. The court noted that the parties disputed the actual visiting
hours. Id.; see supra note 3 and accompanying text. The patient contended that the hospital had
been negligent in its failure to protect her from the intruder's criminal act. Young, 595 So. 2d at
1387. The trial court directed a verdict against the patient, and although it did not specify on what
grounds the directed verdict was based, the Alabama Supreme Court inferred that the trial court
found that the hospital had lacked a legal obligation to protect Ms. Young. Id.
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relationship or circumstance" between the patient and the hospital, the hospital
had a duty to protect the patient from third-party criminal acts.'
Fundamental to the court's reasoning was that the patient was either unable or
less able to protect herself from assaults such as this because of her sedated
state."' The Young court noted, however, that the general rule in Alabama
remains: "[A]bsent special relationships or circumstances, a person has no duty
to protect another from criminal acts of a third person. "I The court further
noted that it still recognizes the difficulty of imposing liability for third-party
intentional criminal acts on an innocent party. 9
The Young court relied on Second Restatement of Torts, section 3 15 for its
analysis,' and held that, because Ms. Young was under the influence of
medication and therefore unable to protect herself from an assault,"' a special
relationship existed. '  The court concluded that this case was excepted from
the general rule because of the special relationship that existed between the
256. Id. at 1387-88. See supra notes 163-97 and accompanying text.
257. Young, 595 So. 2d at 1388. The court stated: "[Riecognition of an additional 'special
relationship' should hinge on 'dependence or mutual dependence' among the parties." Id. at 1389
(quoting B. LINDAHL, DOOLEY'S MODERN TORT LAW: LIAILtrY & LITIGATION § 3.12, at 34
(1984 & 1986 Supp.)) The court further noted that "applying the 'dependence' test, we can hardly
imagine a situation in which a person is more dependent on another for basic bodily protection and
care than the situation of an anesthetized or sedated patient." Id. at 1389.
258. Id. at 1387 (quoting Moye v. A.G. Gaston Motels, Inc., 499 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Ala.
1986)).
259. Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (Ala. 1992) (quoting CIE Serv. Corp.
v. Smith, 460 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Ala. 1984)). The hospital argued that because no evidence of
prior criminal acts existed, Ms. Young's injuries were unforeseeable. The Alabama Supreme Court,
however, relied on the special relationship between Ms. Young and the hospital as the basis for
excepting this case from the general rule, and left the determination of foreseeability for the jury.
Id. at 1388.
260. Id. at 1388 n.3. The court concluded that "[l]ogically, the relationship between a hospital
and a sedated or anesthetized patient would be covered under (b) above." Id.
Section 315 of the Restatement provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing harm to another unless
(a) a special relationship exists between the actor and the third person which imposes
a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relationship exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other
a right to protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
261. The hospital was granted a rehearing on its challenge that the patient was not "heavily
sedated." Young, 595 So. 2d at 1390. Because the issue of sedation was controverted, the court
modified its original opinion to reflect the controverted facts, yet reaffirmed its holding that the
hospital was liable based on the special relationship. Id.
262. Id. at 1388.
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hospital and the patient.3 The Young court cited the national trend of
expanding the special relationship doctrine as support for its decision. 2 The
court also concluded that a situation where more dependence exists than between
an anesthetized patient and the hospital is hardly imaginable.2
In Young, the hospital argued that the patient failed to prove that the
intruder's criminal act was foreseeable because there was no evidence of prior
criminal acts.' The Alabama Supreme Court held, however, that the jury
should decide the question of foreseeability.' Again noting the special
relationship that existed in this particular context, given the patient's dependence
upon the hospital, the court observed that the risk of the patient's harm from an
intruder's criminal conduct was reasonably foreseeable because "the resulting
crime was one the general risk of which was foreseeable."'" In so finding,
the court recognized the special care that a hospital must take when its patients
are dependent on it for their safety.
The Young court struggled with its decision to impose liability upon the
hospital.? When courts impose liability upon hospitals for the intentional
criminal acts of third parties, hospitals bear the burden for acts that they most
often could not foresee. The financial burden may prove to be too much for
financially weakened hospitals to continue their services. Therefore, because
263. Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (Ala. 1992). The court cited Alabama
cases where it upheld either summary judgments or directed verdicts for premises owners where
third-party criminal acts caused injury to invitees, but noted that in none of the cases was the injured
person incapacitated. Id. at 1388 n.4.
264. Id. at 1388.
265. Id. at 1389. The court noted that Ms. Young was dependent on the hospital for basic
bodily protection, among other things, and therefore the special relationship doctrine should apply.
Id.
266. Id. at 1388.
267. Id. The court did not give any guidance as to factors, other than the special relationship
between patient and hospital, for the jury to consider when determining foreseeability.
268. Id. at 1389 (quoting Brock v. Watts Realty Co., 582 So. 2d 438, 441 (Ala. 1991)). For
a complete discussion of Brock, see supra notes 153-60. The court left the task of determining the
foreseeability of this particular criminal assault, however, to the jury after it examines all the facts.
269. The court reiterated the general rule for premises liability in Alabama on several
occasions: "On numerous occasions this court has stated the general rule pertaining to a premises
owner's or occupier's liability for criminal acts of third parties." Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595
So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Ala. 1992). "[We still recognize that '[i]t is difficult to impose liability on one
person for an intentional criminal act by a third person'...... Id. at 1388 (quoting CIE Service
Corp. v. Smith, 460 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Ala. 1984)). "This court has repeatedly upheld summary
judgments and directed verdicts for a premises owner or occupier in cases where an invitee or
employee had sued because of third-party criminal acts." Id. at 1388 n.4. Finally, "[t]he general
rule still is that" imposing liability on a premises owner for a third-party's criminal act is difficult.
Id. at 1389. The court seemed to want to reassert the general rule of no liability even as it strayed
from the general rule in this case, setting a precedent in Alabama for hospital premises liability.
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current law places too great a burden upon hospitals, reform is needed by way
of statutory guidance for both courts and hospitals.'
As courts continue to struggle with whether to impose liability, they impose
burdens upon hospitals that are causing difficulties that deserve some analysis.
The next section examines these burdens in greater detail.
VI. PROBLEMS wrrH IMPOSING LIABILrY ON HosPrrALs
A. Burden on the Hospital
The corporate liability of a hospital includes responsibility for security
problems."' Negligence in maintaining the premises, including security, is
one of the oldest areas of corporate negligence.'m Corporate negligence has
been defined as "the failure of those entrusted with the task of providing
accommodations and facilities necessary to carry out the charitable purposes of
the corporation to follow. . . the established standard of conduct to which the
corporation should conform."' When courts are determining the issue of
whether to expand hospital corporate liability, public policy requires that the
present system be changed to one where the risk associated with providing
medical care can be shared. 4
270. See infra part VU.
271. Janine Fiesta, Security- Whose Liability, Infant idnapping, NURSINOMOMT., May 1990,
at 16. According to Arthur Southwick, "[Wlith respect to corporate negligence the legal question.
becomes what duties does the hospital owe directly to the patient?" Southwick, supra note 18, at
152.
272. Jim M. Perdue, Direct Corporate Liability of Hospitals: A Modem Day Legal Concept
of Liability for Injury Occurring in the Modern Day Hospital, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 773, 789 (1983).
Perdue discusses the three traditional areas of corporate liability for hospitals where, in addition to
maintaining the premises, hospitals are also liable for negligently furnishing defective equipment,
and negligence in staff selection and retention. Modern hospitals must bear corporate liability in six
areas. These areas include the above three, and also: negligence for the failure to supervise
physicians; negligence for failure to develop medical rules or policies as well as liability for any
negligence in performing this duty; and for negligence in enforcing the medical rules or policies that
the hospital formulates. Id.
273. Perdue, supra note 272, at 774 (quoting Bader v. United Orthodox Synagogue, 172 A.2d
192, 194 (Conn. 1961)).
274. Henry M. Brown, Hospital Liability Law: Cost Containment, Marketing and Consumer
Expectation, 55 DEF. COUNS. J. 159, 166-67 (1988). "Since reducing costs of health care to
taxpayers and consumers is a major reason for cost containment, it would be inequitable to expect
hospitals to bear the full burden of expanded liability." Id.
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Increasing violence is costing hospitals money. 5  Many courts are
finding that hospitals failed to provide adequate security, 6 and the resulting
damage awards are burdening an already financially strained health care
system.'m Additionally, as hospitals struggle for survival, half of all hospitals
today are already technically bankrupt.' In light of the current trend of
275. Downey, supra note 48, at 33. "Many judicial rulings have gone against hospitals for lack
of security. I've heard of these cases all over the country-Florida, California, etc. These cases
are costing health care institutions a lot of money." Id. (quoting Stan Price, Director of Security
at NYU Medical Center).
276. Id.; see also Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386 (Ala. 1992) (finding that
hospital failed to provide security to protect a patient from third-party criminal acts based on special
relationship); Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985) (deciding that
hospital had a duty to protect its invitees based on the foreseeability of criminal acts, as determined
by the totality of the circumstances); Rodis v. Herman Kiefer Hosp., 370 N.W.2d 18 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1985) (reversing a summary judgment for a hospital when an independent contractor was shot
by an unidentified assailant, because the property owner has a duty to protect tenants and invitees
from foreseeable criminal activities of third parties); Sylvester v. Northwestern Hosp., 53 N.W.2d
17 (Minn. 1952) (deciding that hospital had a duty to protect patient and take precautions that were
reasonable under the circumstances); Roettger v. United Hosp., 380 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (finding that a hospital's negligent security procedures were the direct cause of a patient's
injuries); Freeman v. St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 548 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
(finding that a hospital violated its duty of protection when a restrained patient was raped by another
patient in emergency room); Clinton v. City of New York, 528 N.Y.S.2d 108 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988) (finding that a hospital failed to properly protect a patient when it negligently failed to control
access to scissors); Small v. McKennan Hosp., 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1987) (finding that a hospital
had a duty to protect its patients and invitees based on the foreseeability of crime as determined by
the totality of the circumstances).
277. To say that the state of health care has reached a crisis point is all but a clich6. Gina
Reese-Aldana, Comment, The Drama of Third-Parry Payor Tort Liability for Cost Containment
Decisions: A Critical Review, 12 WHITTIER L. REV. 591 (1991). The health care system has
undergone tremendous changes over the past thirty years, which now threaten the system's ability
to provide affordable health care to a large portion of the population. Id. This factor translates to
a total health burden that "has been rising by twenty percent per year in the past five years."
Donald Ratajczak, Economic Trends: Health is Making Economy Sick, J. AM. Soc'Y CLU &
CHFC, Mar. 1992, at 11; see also U.S. Health Care Spending Rising Faster Than Other Countries,
J. ACCT., June 1992, at 17 (stating that health spending increased faster in the United States between
1980 and 1990 than in ten other leading countries). Because of increases in health care insurance
costs and health care costs in general, consumers have demanded cost containment measures. Reese-
Aldana, supra, at 594-95. However, these cost constraints on health care are hard to achieve.
Ratajczak, supra, at 11.
One reason advanced for the difficulty in achieving health care cost containment is that too
many patients look for favorable outcomes from health care providers in the face of an inexact
science. Id. Those patients who do not experience a favorable outcome often resort to litigation,
where juries have awarded large judgments even when no errors have been made. Id. Without
significant changes in our current health care system, almost twenty percent of all economic
resources will be spent on health care in the next century. Id. at 12.
278. Jay Ryan, The Changing American Hospital: Back to the Future, HOsp. MATERIAL
MGMT. Q., Feb. 1991 at 3; see also D. Louis Glaser, Comment, Unrelated Trade or Business
Income and Hospitals: Reconciling Operating Losses and Charity Care, 19 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1307
(1988) (stating that many hospitals are already experiencing large operating losses because of
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imposing liability, those hospitals that are already financially weakened in
neighborhoods that most need health care services may be forced to close. 9
Hospitals cannot survive in a climate of unlimited liability.M Hospitals
have been left in the "precarious position of knowing that liability may be
lurking just around the corner, but not knowing what they must do to protect
themselves."" ' The current system has created a "no-win" situation for
hospitals trying to maintain a balance between financial viability and delivery of
liability-free, quality patient care.' In determining this balance, a hospital
must either choose viability of the institution or accessibility for the patients it
serves.
Hospitals have been held to indeterminate and arbitrary standards in cases
involving third-party patient victimization.' The courts have failed to
provide reliable and consistent standards that would define the duty hospitals
could rely upon. The outcome of a successful lawsuit for the plaintiff leaves the
hospital even more vulnerable and confused as to its duty, and the victim still
suffering the consequences of the crime.' The damage awards from
successful lawsuits are causing a financial burden because hospitals have
increased operating costs and growth in uncompensated care); LEwis & SHEPS, supra note 7, at 249
("[Medical centers] may well discover that they cannot survive competitively without substantial
curtailment of the expensive tertiary-care services on which they now focus. Alternatively, if the
total resources become very limited, the volune of needed care may diminish very substantially.').
279. STARR, supra note 7, at 387. The Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement systems have
caused hospitals in poor neighborhoods to have financial difficulties. The result is that healthcare
institutions with limited resources are left to care for those people who remain uninsured. Hospital
closings are threatened in some regulated states like Massachusetts, Maine, New York, and New
Jersey. Willam 0. Cleverley, Hospital Closings: Fact & Fiction, HEALTHCARE EXEcuTiVE,
Sept./Oct. 1990, at 27. A recently released list from the American Hospital Association names 65
community hospitals that closed in 1989. Id. at 26.
280. Indeed, hospitals would probably pass the cost of expanded liability on to its patients in
order to survive. With the total costs of health care rising, institutions are passing those costs onto
both consumers and taxpayers. Consumers bear the cost-shifting by paying more out-of-pocket
expenses for health care, and taxpayers bear the cost by paying increased taxes. Reese-Aldana,
supra note 277, at 591.
281. Id. at 626-27.
282. Id. at 599 (discussing concerns about how cost containment efforts affect the quality of
patient care).
283. See supra notes 198-270 and accompanying text.
284. Crime victims experience physical, financial, and emotional trauma from the crime.
Roland, supra note 93, at 35. In addition, the crime victim often endures intrusive questioning and
frustration with a criminal justice system that offers little information concerning the status of the
proceedings against the criminal. Id. Crime victims also often suffer lost wages, medical expenses,
and lack of support from both the legal system and their own support system. Id. at 35.
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difficulty insuring against an unforeseen risk.' The courts and legislatures
must re-examine the health care system and its delivery in light of society's
broader goals of access to health care'5 and equitable public policy issues.'
B. Public Policy Issues
Holding a hospital liable for the intentional criminal acts of a third person
upon a patient "does little more than prefer the unjust treatment of one class of
persons to the unjust treatment of another."' Where the hospital and the
patient are both innocent victims of a third-party criminal, it is inequitable to
place the entire burden on the hospital.' In Goldberg v. Housing
Authority,' the court observed that "[flairness ordinarily requires that a man
be able to ascertain in advance of a jury's verdict whether the duty is his and
whether he has performed it."29 Duty is a question of fairness and requires
that the court weigh several factors: the relationship between the parties, the
285. Although some people would argue that a hospital's liability for third-party patient
victimization is merely a cost of doing business, unlimited liability goes beyond any notion of
foreseeable costs. That courts have failed to issue consistent standards that hospitals can rely upon
and determine their risk is the core issue. See McNeal v. Henry, 266 N.W.2d 469 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978). This case discusses the presence of unsavory characters in both large and small communities
who roam businesses, stealing and assaulting legitimate patrons. The court observed: "We fear that
to hold businessmen liable for the clearly unforeseeable third-party torts and crimes incident to these
activities would eventually drive them out of business." Id. at 470 n. 1. A consistent approach
would lead to predictable costs for the hospital, which the hospital could then insure for adequately.
286. See supra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.
287. Reese-Aldana, supra note 277, at 634. "Mhe hospital system has grown in response to
perceived social need-in comparison with normal budgetary constraints and compromises have
come to seem niggling and inappropriate. Security, like any absolute and immeasurable good,
legitimates enormous demands on society's resources." Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 350.
288. Hanson & Thomas, supra note 20, at 31. The authors further state, "We doubt that a
judicially-imposed redistribution of inequity deserves to be viewed as the cornerstone of any body
of law." Id.
289. Wright v. Webb, 362 S.E.2d 919, 920 (Va. 1987); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 74, at 20:
It is sometimes said that compensation for losses is the primary function of tort law and
the primary factor influencing its development. It is perhaps more accurate to describe
the primary function as one of determining when compensation is to be required.
Courts leave a loss where it is unless they find good reason to shift it.
Id. The authors then suggested that a need for compensation is a powerful, driving factor in tort
law; however, it is not the sole determinant that victims' rights activists would have courts believe.
Id. See also supra notes 68-97 and accompanying text.
290. Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 186 A.2d 291 (N.J. 1962).
291. Id. at 297 (discussing the inherent vagueness of the duty to protect that the plaintiff-victim
urged the court to impose upon the Housing Authority).
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nature and extent of the risk, and the public's interest in any proposed
solution.M
Hospitals are left with the arduous task of trying to balance the desire to
maintain a hospitable and open environment with the need to create a safe and
secure situation for patients, visitors, and staff.' Recent marketing
techniques, in response to consumer demands, have left hospitals more
vulnerable to criminal activities.' For example, many hospitals have
developed obstetrics units where, in order to facilitate the bonding process
between the infant and its family, friends and relatives are allowed to visit. 5
The result is that many obstetrics units are now more easily accessible, 29 and
hospitals advertise this vulnerability by way of marketing.' Imposing
liability may, therefore, force hospitals to restrict visitor access to patients to
achieve a higher level of security. Alternatively, hospitals may need to
discontinue some of the outreach and outpatient services they offer so that, by
292. Id. at 293. The New Jersey Supreme Court observed, "The question is not simply
whether a criminal event is foreseeable, but whether a duty exists to take measures to guard against
it." Id. The court ultimately determined that, in this case, the Housing Authority did not have a
duty to provide police protection to prevent third-party criminal attacks. Id.
293. Morgan, supra note 47, at 29; see also Ryan, supra note 278, at 4 ("The vision is that
while hospitals will continue to be places for the seriously ill, hospitals will become less
intimidating, more friendly, and more sensitive to the needs of the patient and the potential
patient."); Hospital's Duty to Protect Patients Explored, Hosp. L. NEWSL., June 1993, at 2
(discussing Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d. 1386 (Ala. 1991): "[A] hospital... has a very
difficult chore. It seeks to balance its interest in not having the hospital emphasize security like a
military base, and thereby change the milieu of the institution, with recognition of its duty to protect
dependent individuals from the transgressions of others.").
294. Best, supra note 14, at 77 (stating that hospitals now provide an open door policy);
American Health Consultants, supra note 14, at 127 (revealing that hospital obstetrics units provide
more accessibility so that family members may "bond" with the new infant); Ryan, supra note 278,
at 4 (explaining that hospitals are encouraging outreach programs and elder programs). In addition
to these programs, hospitals are marketing outpatient fitness and wellness programs, mental health
programs, and drug addiction services. See, e.g., Newspaper Advertisement from Chicago Institute
or Neurosurgery and Neuroresearch, CHI. TRiB., Nov. 1, 1993, § 2, at 3 (describing outpatient
physical therapy services for the facility's Comprehensive Spine Care Center); Newspaper
Advertisement from EHS Health Care, CiI. TRIB., Nov. 1, 1993, § 5, at 3 (advertising psychiatric
referral services offered by the facility and its subsidiaries).
295. American Health Consultants, supra note 14, at 127.
296. Id. Many hospitals advertise birthing centers that are more like a home atmosphere than
a hospital room, where family and friends can visit during expanded visiting hours. This advertising
has been distributed through the mail, television, radio, and newspaper media.
297. See, e.g., AMERICAN HEALTH CONSULTANTS, supra note 14, at 127 (stating that hospitals
offer birthing rooms so that families can bond with the new infant). Other examples of marketing
to increase hospital use, thereby increasing hospital vulnerability, are elder clubs and other outreach
programs. Ryan, supra note 278, at 4; see also supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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restricting the traffic within the hospital, premises security may be
enhanced.9
While hospitals struggle with marketing techniques, courts struggle with
victim compensation statutes, another public policy issue. Other forums,
however, have already addressed victim compensation issues.' Many states,
along with the federal legislature, have designed a remedy for victims to recover
costs for medical expenses, lost wages, and other losses, in the form of victim
restitution and victim compensation acts." Some states are even addressing
the victims' rights problem through state constitutional amendments.' Courts
and juries understandably feel compassion and sympathy toward victims of
criminal acts. 3  This sympathy often results in a jury awarding a judgment
for the victim against the premises owner.' These efforts, through legislative
acts and constitutional amendments, provide a remedy for the problem that
courts and juries try to correct.' °4 Therefore, no need exists to try and
provide a double recovery for victims of crime, thereby overburdening hospitals.
The burden of shifting public protection functions from government to the
private sector is also a public policy concern. Crime detection and prevention
belong to police forces that are trained by the government in highly specialized
298. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. In response to successful security lawsuits,
hospitals may restrict access to hospitals, thereby turning hospitals into "mini-prisons." Patients
would be restricted to certain areas, and visitor access would be severely curtailed. Visiting hours
would be strictly enforced, but in addition, the hospitals could restrict who could visit patients. The
relative freedom of access to patients that our society now enjoys would be dramatically altered.
As one author states, "The confluence of cost containment, alternatives in marketing and increasing
consumer expectation impacts the practice of hospital liability law now and will in the future."
Brown, supra note 274, at 160.
299. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
300. Roland, supra note 93, at 35, 36 & n.8. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
301. See, e.g., ictims-Rights Effort Rolling, But Some Question Fairness, THE JOURNAL-
GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Nov. 8, 1992, at 1. At least five states have already endorsed a
constitutional amendment that would create a Victims' Bill of Rights, and the measure has been
proposed in at least thirteen states. Id.
302. Cope, supra note 22, at 87.
303. Tort law cannot provide a remedy to every injured patient who is harmed by another's
antisocial conduct. Henderson, supra note 91, at 514. Where a patient is injured by a third-party's
criminal act, jury sympathy may lie with the innocent injured patient. The problem becomes, then,
one of defining the limits of liability "with sufficient formality to allow the courts to implement them
in a principled fashion." Id. at 515; but see Cope, supra note 22, at 87:
Property owners... can only be held liable for another's criminal acts if the risk was
foreseeable and reasonable precautions were not taken. Juries don't blindly award huge
sums to victims. You have to have a very strong case for juror appeal because you've
got the intervening act of a third person.
Id. (quoting a Chicago attorney).
304. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
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skills.' Traditionally, an increase in the crime rate has been addressed by
legislative enactments, which are then implemented by an executive body."
The public sector historically has taken such measures as increasing the quantity
of police patrols or providing for more severe criminal penalties.' However,
with the growing willingness of courts to shift the government's public
protection functions to private businesses," the public will lose rather than
gain protection. Police forces will lose the incentive to diligently patrol in
business areas because they will rely on the business owners to provide security
on the premises. In addition, because the training of private security forces is
not regulated,' differing levels of competence will determine the
effectiveness of such forces.31  As the Goldberg3 ' court observed, "the
duty to provide police protection is and should remain the duty of government
and not of the [private sector]."32
That is not to say, however, that a hospital does not have a duty to provide
security for its patients. Hospitals should have a statutory duty2 3 to employ
security guards and train them according to established standards. Legislatures,
rather than the courts, should be responsible for imposing a duty to protect upon
hospitals.
VII. PROPOSAL
This Note proposes a model statute that states can adopt to ensure a
consistent approach to hospital premises liability for patients. The following
model statute mandates that all hospitals establish and maintain a security force
305. Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 186 A.2d 291, 296 (N.J. 1962).
306. Harris & Gilbertson, supra note 89, at 15.
307. Id.
308. Id. Private businesses can contract for security services, rather than employing and
training their own security guards. Guardsmar* Forms Healthcare Division, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Oct. 26, 1992, at 17.
309. Interview with William Smith, President of Indiana Association of Hospital Security, and
Director of Safety & Security, Parkview Memorial Hospital, Fort Wayne, Indiana (Nov. 3, 1992)
(stating that no formal regulations exist for hospital security, but many hospitals use the International
Association for Healthcare Security & Safety standards for annual training).
310. "It must be remembered that the criminal is also a professional, frequently more
professional than the security guard." Robert Yeager, The Security Duty of Care, 3 J. HEALTHCARE
PROTECTION MGMT. (1987) (discussing the importance of a security survey to develop a plan to
eliminate security weaknesses).
311. Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 186 A.2d 291 (N.J. 1962).
312. Id. at 298-99.
313. A trend in hospital liability law is for the courts to take away a hospital's temptation to
formulate and follow inferior standards of care, and to look to statutes and other standards, rather
than custom, on which to base liability. Perdue, supra note 272, at 813. According to Professor
Henderson, courts are not competent, without appreciable direction from the law, to solve all societal
problems, even risk management problems. Henderson, supra note 91, at 478.
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to detect and deter crime and other dangerous acts.' 4  When hospitals are
required to create and maintain a security force, the probability of patient injury
from a third party's criminal acts will decrease. 35  Because it is unlikely that
a hospital can prevent all crimes on its premises, the hospital must devise ways
to detect crime and respond to patient needs." 6 By enacting the following
statute, states can provide a basis to find liability for patient injuries caused by
third parties, and hospitals will know thestandard they will be held to in such
an event.
The statute adopts the totality of the circumstances test that the Isaacs11
court set forth, and expands it to include the special relationship that the
Young 3t court used to determine liability. Additionally, the statute considers
the crime factors set forth by United States Department of Justice," 9 as well
as the procedural aspects of a hospital's operation, the types of services it
314. The Emergency Nurses Association, which boasts 21,000 members, recently proposed
legislation in California that would:
1) require hospitals with major problems in their emergency rooms to position metal detectors
and cameras in the vicinity;
2) establish minimum standards for security guard training;
3) require staff education on handling aggressive people;
4) require reporting of violence against ER staff; and
5) prosecute the perpetrators of criminal violent acts.
Faivelson, supra note 16, at 61. The group's recommendations also include a provision that would
charge the Joint Commission of the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations or another state
surveyor group with assessing a hospital's security requirements during each accreditation site visit.
Nigel Keep & Paul Glibert, California Emergency Nurses Association Introduces Prototype State
Legislation to Fight Violence in the Emergency Department, J. EMERGENCY NURSING, Oct. 1992,
at 441.
315. Total eradication of third party crime is probably not an achievable goal. One author
equates a hospital to a living organism and finds that some crime and security-related losses are
expected and even tolerated, "while still permitting survivability of the system (i.e., continued
existence of the hospital)." Robert A. Smith, A Systems Approach to Understanding Problems and
Solutions in the Healthcare Security Field, J. HEALTHCARE PROTECTION MGMT., Summer 1991, at
58; see also Carrington, A New Tort?, supra note 22, at 41 (stating that forced security measures
may make premises less inviting to criminals).
316. JAMES T, TURNER, VIOLENCE IN THE MEDICAL CARE SETTING: A SURVIVAL GUIDE 218
(1984). Turner suggests that four security functions exist: prevention, detection, response, and
security education. These four functions should be carefully integrated into any hospital security
plan, so that hospitals will not have to respond to situations in a "knee-jerk" fashion. Id. at 218-19.
Similarly, courts should not respond to hospital premises liability cases in a "knee-jerk" fashion.
Courts should have a basis on which to impose a hospital's liability, rather than some vague standard
that depends upon the whim of the court or of the jury.
317. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985); see also supra notes
236-51 and accompanying text.
318. Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386 (Ala. 1992); see also supra notes 163-97,
255-70 and accompanying text.
319. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 36, at v.
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provides, and the types of clients it serves.?
A. Uniform Hospital Security Statute
1.1 Definitions
As used in this statute-
(a) The term "hospital" shall refer to any health care facility that
provides acute inpatient care.
(b) The term "security" shall refer to persons employed in the role
of security officer or guard, and who are responsible for security,
safety, and the prevention of criminal activity.
(c) The term "third party" shall refer to persons who are neither
employed by the hospital nor are patients of the hospital.
(d) The term "patient" shall refer to a person who enters the hospital
for medical or other care.
1.2 Minimum Standards for Hospital Security
(a) A hospital shall create and maintain a security program that shall
include, but not be limited to, the use of security officer(s) as
necessary to protect patients, considering the factors in § 1.3(b).
(b) Each security officer shall be certified according (o standards set
forth by the International Association of Hospital Safety and Security,
as amended, and shall undergo annual recertification.
(c) A hospital shall also install and maintain any security equipment
and device that the hospital board deems necessary in consideration of
§ 1.3(b).
(d) A hospital shall establish a security training program for all
hospital employees, and shall provide such training to each employee
upon initial employment, and annually thereafter.
320. Many of the factors were also obtained from an article by Chris E. McGoey, A Model of
Foreseeability, J. HEALTHCARE PROTECTION MGMT., Spring 1990, at 54-57. McGoey's article
outlines a model for hospital security directors to follow to determine the crime foreseeability of
their particular premises.
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1.3 Cause of Action
(a) A hospital shall be liable for the failure to provide reasonably
necessary security to prevent the foreseeable criminal acts of third
parties against its patients, as determined by § 1.3(b).
(b) The foreseeability of criminal acts as used in § 1.3(a) shall be
determined by the following crime foreseeability evaluation factors:
(1) nature of the premises, including premises type and
usage, hours of operation, type of patients, type of services
available, and extent of public accessibility to the premises;
and
(2) crime demographics for the geographic area surrounding
the premises, the time frame consideration, the nature and
extent of available data, and the consideration of documented
criminal acts and an estimate of their proportion to the true
number of criminal acts actually committed, both on the
premises and in the surrounding geographic area; and
(3) location of the premises, including consideration of the
geographical location of the city, the geographical
relationship of the premises to other businesses and
residences, the density of the population, the economic
demographics of the hospital's neighborhood, and the
hospital's accessibility to imajor traffic arteries; and
(4) physical conditions of and surrounding the premises,
including amount and nature of security devices employed,
lighting, noise level, visibility, and traffic flow, both
pedestrian and vehicular; and
(5) security procedures used by the hospital such as security
policies and methods (including patrol routes and frequency,
procedures and schedules for locking doors, the use of
restricted areas that are either card-access or key-access),
and incident reporting procedures; and
(6) the hospital's annual budget in relation to the types of
services it provides; and
(7) the nature and extent of the injury that the patient
incurs; and
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(8) the relationship of the patient to the hospital; and
(9) the extent of the patient's disability; and
(10) all other relevant factors.
1.4 Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations begins to run at the time the patient is
injured, and ends two years after the date of injury.
1.5 Remedy
The injured patient may recover medical expenses, lost wages, and
other actual damages related to the injury. Punitive damages are not
recoverable, unless the hospital, by clear and convincing evidence,
acted with malice or with willful or wanton misconduct.
B. Application of the Statute
A statute is needed to remedy the problem of defining a hospital's duty to
protect its patients from third-party criminal acts, because the common law
schemes that courts have applied have left hospitals open to unlimited liability.
The legislative purposes of this statute are to protect patients' safety and to give
hospitals notice of both the standard and the foreseeability factors that courts
will use to determine liability. The statute's ultimate effect will be to preserve
health care services in areas where these services are most needed. 2'
Adoption of this statute would ensure that hospitals provide properly trained
security officers to enhance patient safety.3"  The cost of yearly re-
certification for each security officer is minimal, so that the hospital would not
be unduly burdened financially.3' In addition, patient safety would be
321. See supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
323. According to the International Association of Hospital Security and Safety, certification
using the standards set by the same group, is $20.00 per officer. INT'L ASS'N HEALTHCARE
SECURITY & SAFETY, BASIC TRAINING STANDARD FOR HEALTHCARE SECURITY PERSONNEL, May
1990. However, Louis Gasbarro, president of the International Association for Healthcare Security
and Safety, argues that because security measures cost money, hospital administrators must balance
patient and staff protection with the hospitals' budgets. Faivelson, supra note 16, at 61.
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enhanced by providing security training to all hospital employees. 3' For
example, training would possibly decrease the vulnerability of patients who enter
the hospital with injuries caused by an abusive spouse,' because security
trained employees could take measures to insulate the patient from the
abuser. 32
Due to the unlimited number of variables that exist, the proposed model
statute cannot provide for all of the individual characteristics of hospitals or for
unique locations. 3 7  Specific guidelines would, if appropriate, need to come
from the individual state legislatures as they modify the statute to fit the
particular needs of their states.
Nevertheless, the statute sets forth many of the key factors that courts must
324. According to a survey conducted by the California Emergency Nurses Association, most
nursing managers felt insufficiently trained to respond to a violent emergency situation adequately.
Nigel Keep & Paul Glibert, Caifornia Emergency Nurses Association's Informal Survey of Violence
in California Emergency Departments, J. EMERGENCY NURSING, Oct. 1992, at 436. The key to
enlarging security measures is in training each hospital employee in basic security measures and
general crime prevention techniques. Anthony J. Luizo, Stretching the Security Dollar, J.
HEALTHCARE PROTECTION MGr., Summer 1991, at 101. According to William Smith, President
of the Indiana chapter of the International Association of Hospital Security and Safety, Ohospital staff
accepts everybody at face value, and they need to be more in name with the circumstances of a
situation." He further noted that most hospitals have no ongoing staff training in security issues.
Smith, supra note 309. Security directors have had difficulty persuading hospital administration that
staff security training programs are necessary. This difficulty has been due to several factors,
including insufficient security staff to provide staff training, inadequate knowledge of continuing
education principles, equipment shortages, high employee turnover, and the lack of interest among
hospital supervisors and employees in security training. Sharyn Taitz, Winning Employee Support
for Your Crime Prevention Program, 3 J. HEALTHCARE PROTECTION MGMT., 1987, at 36-37. See
also supra notes 314-16 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
326. Such measures could include altering the information entered into the computer (such as
using an alias name), and possibly alerting other hospital employees of potential further harm from
the abuser; see also Robert A. Massey & Dan Ballard, Unit Safety Coordinator Program-Sharing
the Safety Responsibility, 4 J. HFALTHCARE PROTECTION MGMT., Fall 1988, at 105 (stating that
because a small safety staff has limited capabilities, enlisting the entire hospital staff to assist in
safety issues will not only enhance compliance with safety standards, but also offer hospitals a cost-
effective way to enhance security).
327. Each hospital could develop a crime-tracking program in conjunction with other hospitals
in a designated area. Such a program was developed by fourteen hospitals in northern California,
and was patterned after a similar program police used for gathering crime statistics. Estrella, supra
note 9, at 30-31, However, hospitals could rely on the crime statistics that each state compiles to
determine the risk of crime in the hospital's location. See supra note 36 and accompanying text
(containing a discussion of factors that the Unites States Department of Justice has identified that
affect the crime rate in a geographical area). Note the distinction from a medical malpractice
standard, which is a nationwide standard, rather than a "community" standard. Southwick, supra
note 18, at 147; see also Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979) (stating that a
standard of care for medical malpractice should be national, not local).
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consider when determining the foreseeability of a given criminal act. By using
the criteria suggested by the United States Department of Justice,328 courts can
have uniform factors by which to determine foreseeability. By considering
factors such as services," clientele,' and location,33  courts can consider
that poor hospitals in crime-ridden neighborhoods may be held to different
standards than private hospitals in safer environments. By giving the courts the
factors that they must consider, much of the arbitrariness will be eliminated
from the decisions that they issue. Additionally, by directing courts to consider
the relevant radius, the court can apply a smaller radius in an urban area where
population is more dense, and use a larger radius in a rural area where the
population is more diffuse, thereby making the inquiry more useful in
determining foreseeability.
Given the variables under which hospitals operate and the varying
conditions that contribute to crime, a rigid definition of foreseeability is
inconceivable. However, if courts have a framework to base their inquiries
upon, a more consistent and less arbitrary body of hospital premises liability law
will be developed. Hospitals, too, will have a framework on which to base their
security programs. A particular hospital can then measure its own risk aversion
against the factors that it knows a court will hold it to in a lawsuit. Therefore,
rather than developing a rigid definition for foreseeability, the statute attempts
to develop a "cohesive methodology" 332 to determine whether crime is
foreseeable. Also, when viewed in its entirety, the statute discourages an
emphasis on one particular factor and encourages an analysis of all the
conditions. The flexibility of the statute allows consideration of changes that
occur within hospitals, such as construction333 or use of the facility, and allows
for changes in hospital neighborhood characteristics. 3'
328. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
329. For example, a hospital that offers many outpatient services may be at more risk of
criminal activity because of the increased traffic flow and because the hospital has less control over
the patients it sees.
330. The type of clientele served may be a significant factor when determining foreseeability.
For example, a children's hospital may have special security needs because the age of its patients
would make the patients perhaps more vulnerable. Moreover, a hospital that specializes in obstetrics
and gynecology may put its patients at risk by providing health services to exclusively women. By
contrast, hospitals that serve veterans may be less inviting to criminals because of the large numbers
of male patients.
33 1. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
332. McGoey, supra note 320, at 53. McGoey suggests that such an approach will provide a
sound assessment of the reasonable foreseeability of crime in a particular situation. Id.
333. See, e.g., Robert A. Massey & Dan Ballard, Unit Safety Coordinator Program-Sharing
the Safety Responsibility, 4 J. HEALTHCARE PROTECTION MOMT., Fall 1988, at 104 (stating that
hospitals may face increased safety risks during periods of construction).
334. McGoey, supra note 320, at 53.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 [1993], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss1/9
PATIENTS AS VICTIMS
The statute also gives courts and hospitals guidelines as to the statute of
limitations and remedies that may be sought under the statute. These guidelines
will help ensure that patients bring their lawsuits in a timely manner,335 and
will also ensure that hospitals are not held to unlimited liability.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Hospitals are being held liable for patient victimization from third-party
criminals, yet they lack a consistent standard to define the hospital's duty. The
rising crime rate has not exempted hospital patients from the risk of being
victimized by third-party criminals, and patients are suing hospitals for the
failure to provide adequate protection. Courts have based hospital liability upon
the emerging third-party tort suits against premises owners. Some modem
courts have recognized the special relationship that exists between the patient
and the hospital, and have based premises liability on the special relationship.
Other courts have determined the foreseeability of a criminal act by looking at
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident.
Nevertheless, because courts have not used a uniform and consistent
standard to determine the hospital's liability, hospitals are open to unlimited
liability for often unforeseeable patient harm. Such unlimited liability may result
in hospitals providing fewer healthcare services in areas that need these services
the most. Imposing unlimited liability upon hospitals is also against the public
policy of equity. A model statute that requires hospitals to provide security can
both help prevent future patient injury and give courts a consistent standard for
measuring hospital liability. Therefore, patients will be protected and hospitals
will know the standard that courts will use to determine liability.
N. Jean Schendel
335. See, e.g., Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585, 604 (Ind. 1980): The general
purpose of a statute of limitation is to encourage prompt presentation of claims. Id. (quoting United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979)).
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